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I. INTRODUCTION
We begin with a puzzling fact. Although the study of administra-
tive law began in earnest more than fifty years ago, we still know little
about what is perhaps the central question in that field: How does judi-
cial review actually affect agency decisionmaking? This question goes to
the fundamental nature and quality of the modem administrative state,
Vol. 1990:984]
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yet academic specialists have largely neglected it;I the subject remains a
matter for uninformed speculation.2
Despite (or perhaps because of) the lack of data, however, strong
opinions on this question are common. Our conversations and our read-
ing persuade us that every self-respecting administrative lawyer has firm,
if not always articulate or even consistent, convictions about the effect of
judicial review upon agencies. Proof of this assertion abounds. Lawyers
and their clients devote vast resources to challenging agency actions in
the courts.3 With Talmudic intensity, legions of legal scholars analyze
the language and logic of judicial opinions in administrative law cases. 4
Agencies themselves exhibit great concern about how reviewing courts
respond to their handiwork. Manifestly, the "experts" act as if judicial
review of agency action were worth fighting, writing, and worrying
about. They believe, in short, that what courts say to agencies matters,
and matters deeply.
But although there may be widespread agreement that judicial re-
view of agency action matters, there is no consensus about precisely how
and under what circumstances it matters. As Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst recently put it, "The normative expectations of administrative
lawyers have seldom been subjected to empirical verification of a more
1. The few exceptions in the legal literature involve a consideration of this question in quite
particular contexts. See eg., Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 554-55 (1974) (discussing EPA's response to remand in International Har-
vester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under
the Administrative Procedure Act" A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 425-36
(1975) (discussing responses by three agencies to judicial interpretation of APA requiring more for-
mal procedures in informal rulemaking by EPA). A broader empirical study of the court-agency
relationship, Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies" An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 COLUM.
L. REv. 800 (1975), focuses upon judicial strategies of supervision rather than upon how agencies
respond to remands. For a critique of the regulatory role of public tort law, see P. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT: CrTIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 3-12, 125-81 (1983).
Some political scientists also have examined this question. See, eg., R. MELNICK, REGULA-
TION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr (1983); S. WASBY, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1988).
2. This irony, of course, is common to all fields, not just law. By some perversity of intellec-
tual inquiry, the most interesting and important questions in life are usually the most elusive and
opaque.
3. The number of administrative law cases in the federal appellate courts is large and growing.
See infra Chart 1.
4. There are several publications devoted exclusively to administrative law doctrine. See, ag.,
ADMIN. L. REv. (published by the American Bar Association); ADMIN. L.J. (published by Ameri-
can University). There are also numerous specialized journals concerned with judicial review of
agency decisions in particular policy areas, eg., J. AIR L. & COMM.; J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y; and at
least one leading law review publishes an annual administrative law issue, see DUKE LJ.
986 [Vol. 1990:984
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than anecdotal sort."5 And different observers evidently rely upon differ-
ent anecdotes.
Virtually all administrative law writers and teachers at one time or
another assiduously seek to expand and fine-tune judicial review of
agency action, and they usually advocate a variety of institutional and
doctrinal reforms for those purposes.6 They suppose, at least by implica-
tion, that what courts do matters substantively-that when a court de-
cides that an agency erred or failed adequately to support its action, the
court's ruling actually (and not just normatively) controls the agency's
subsequent behavior in that case. This behavioral supposition, after all,
is one of the raisons d'etre of most of administrative law. The conven-
tional explanation for judicial review of agency action is the need to con-
fine agencies to their legal authority. To deny that courts actually
perform this task is to raise dark and difficult questions about the com-
patibility of the administrative state with the rule of law.7
On the other hand, academic discussion of these questions (some-
times by the very same writers) often proceeds as if the axiom of judicial
control of agency action were empirically false." Certain inexorable con-
ditions, it is said, limit the capacity of reviewing courts to shape an
agency's conduct. Pointing to factors such as the narrow "bite" of legal
doctrine, the political context of administrative decisionmaking, judicial
deference to agency expertise, the scope of agency discretion, an agency's
control of its agenda, the limited resources of litigants, and the pro-
tracted nature of agency proceedings, these commentators emphasize
that in practice, if not in principle, an agency usually has the last word as
well as the first.9 Writing more than twenty years ago, political scientist
Martin Shapiro crystallized this view in the statement that "courts typi-
cally let the agency do what it pleases."' 1
5. Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4
YALE J. REG. 257, 275 (1987). See generally Schuck, hy Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical
Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989).
6. Eg., K. DAVIS, DIsCRETONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 54-59, 219-22
(1971) (advocating a form of the non-delegation doctrine that would encourage agencies to confine
their discretionary power through rulemaking); Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 578 (1984) (arguing for the aban-
donment of "rigid separation of powers compartmentalization" in favor of a more practical analysis
in terms of "separation of functions and checks and balances").
7. See, e-g., Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLum. L. REv. 1, 6
(1983).
8. See eg., K. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 27-28, 215-16 (agency discretion limits effectiveness of
judicial review).
9. Practitioners, needless to say, find themselves on all sides of this question; their positions
depend not only upon their experiences and orientations but also upon whether they are seeking to
persuade their clients to challenge or to defend the agency's position.
10. M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME CouRT AND ADMINsTRAThE AGENcms 265 (1968).
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Which of these views is correct? We suspect that there is considera-
ble truth in both views-that judicial review "matters" in all cases (if
only because review occasions delay and additional cost before the
agency's action can be implemented), but that it has different effects
which depend upon a variety of factors. That much, of course, can be
confidently asserted about virtually any legal phenomenon as complex as
the interaction between courts and agencies. The more interesting and
challenging question is whether research can identify those factors and
effects, discern significant patterns in the relationship between them, and
derive systematic conclusions that can illuminate the ways in which re-
viewing courts actually shape agency behavior.
Believing that the possibility of such research must at least be enter-
tained, we undertook a large-scale empirical study of how federal agency
actions fare when they are reviewed directly by appellate courts.
Although we were especially interested in the fate of cases that a review-
ing court remands to the initiating agency for further proceedings, we
anticipated that such a study could also be designed to generate data
bearing upon a number of other important, albeit subsidiary, features of
administrative law.
In the course of our study, we have come to appreciate all too well
how problematic such research inevitably must be. The government does
publish data on the number, type, and judicial disposition of the adminis-
trative cases that are appealed to the federal courts.11 But those data,
although useful, are too highly aggregated to answer most of the more
specific questions that we hoped to answer. We therefore were obliged to
gather our own data in ways that are described below in Part II, and we
consoled ourselves with the conviction that on questions of this impor-
tance and interest, even imperfect information is better than perfect
ignorance.
Our report is divided into four parts. In Part II, we describe our
study design, organizing the discussion around our four principal goals
and explaining the specific procedures that we used to pursue each of
them.
We present our findings and analysis of the 1965, 1975, 1984-85, and
1988 data in Part III. We organize this discussion in four general sec-
tions. In the first two, we emphasize certain changes that occurred in
administrative law during the twenty years between 1965 and 1985.
These changes relate to the style of appellate court opinions and the out-
11. Data on administrative cases brought before the federal courts can be found in the ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DRECTOR OF THE ADMINIsTRATiVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (published
jointly with REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES).
[Vol. 1990:984
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comes and certain structural features of judicial review of agency cases
(what we call the "ages of administrative law"). In the third section, we
draw upon data gathered for 1984-85 and 1988, focusing on how the
Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 12 affected
the patterns of appellate court remands to agencies and considering
whether those effects had dissipated by 1988, almost four years after
Chevron was decided. In the fourth section, we analyze a crucial ques-
tion that has received virtually no attention from commentators: What
actually happens to remanded cases after they are returned to the
agencies?
In Part IV, we distill the major conclusions of our study. We begin
by offering some observations about the strengths and limitations of our
general methodological approach as a tool for identifying and under-
standing changes in the patterns of court decisions. We then summarize
our principal findings.
II. OBJEcTivEs AND STUDY DESIGN
We began our study with four principal objectives in mind. First,
we hoped to describe the general parameters of judicial review of federal
administrative action. Although we recognize the diversity of agencies,
agency actions, reviewing courts, and judicial dispositions of agency
cases, we attempted to render that diversity manageable by focusing our
attention upon some broad categories of information. For example, we
wanted to establish the number of agency decisions that are reviewed by
the courts of appeals; the proportion of those cases that are affirmed,
reversed, and remanded by the courts; the frequency with which cases
are remanded for particular reasons; and the distribution of these vari-
ables among the different federal agencies and courts of appeals. At the
same time, we hoped to shed light upon some ancillary, but potentially
interesting attributes of judicial review of agency decisions, such as the
length and footnoting of judicial opinions, the number of split decisions,
the size of appellate panels, the type of agency proceeding being re-
viewed, and the frequency with which the courts applied different stan-
dards of review. To that end, we decided to read a large,13
12. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13. The total number of cases in our 1965-1985 sample is 2325, consisting of 372 decided in
1965, 277 decided in 1974-75, and 1676 decided in 1984-85. The number of cases in our 1988 sample
is 147. The grand total, therefore, is 2472 cases. The datasets, and the reasons for constituting them
as we did, are explained infra text accompanying notes 16-32.
Vol. 1990:984]
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representative14 sample of opinions in which federal courts of appeals
engaged in direct review 15 of agency action.
Second, we hoped to reveal some of the dynamic patterns of admin-
istrative law by gathering these kinds of data for cases decided over a
period of time that would bracket the two decades, 1965 to 1985, during
which judicial review of agency action, by most accounts, experienced
fundamental conceptual and doctrinal changes relating to issues of stand-
ing, reviewability, standard and scope of review, and other basic issues. 16
We therefore decided to read opinions rendered during five discrete time
periods. Four of them were six-month periods: in 1965, just before this
transformation of judicial review is thought to have begun; in 1974-75, at
a mid-way point during that twenty-year period; in 1984, after the trans-
formation was thought to have concluded and just before Chevron was
decided; and in 1985, after the Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified
Chevron. The fifth time period covered two months in early 1988, which
was selected in order to learn whether the changes observed during the
1984-85 period had endured.
The 1984-85 period has the virtue of being close enough to the pres-
ent to reflect the current state of administrative law (at least as revealed
by our data), while also being distant enough from the present to facili-
tate our third objective-revealing what actually happens when appellate
courts remand cases to federal agencies for further proceedings. For this
purpose, it was necessary that enough time had elapsed since the remand
so that the vast majority of remanded cases could have reached their
conclusions in order for us to analyze them as part of our dataset.1 7
14. Our sample included cases from each of the 16 appellate courts (the D.C. Circuit, the I1
numbered circuits, the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Federal
Circuit, and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals) that heard direct appeals from executive
branch agencies during the period under study. A list of the agencies, together with their coding
keys, is appended as Appendix A.
15. We excluded all cases, such as Social Security Act adjudications, that had come to the
courts of appeals through the federal district courts or through specialized judicial tribunals such as
the U.S. Tax Court
16. See, eg., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 1-ARv. L. RV.
1669, 1670 (1975) (noting that during this period, the Supreme Court had largely eliminated the
standing barrier to challenges of agency action in court and that judges had accorded interest groups
the right to force the initiation of formal agency proceedings).
17. When we ended the data collection in early 1988, two categories of remanded cases re-
mained incomplete: (1) those in which the lawyers had not provided all of the necessary information
during the initial and follow-up interviews, and (2) those that had still been "open" (i.e., post-re-
mand activity was still ongoing) at that point. In an effort to include these cases in our dataset, we
made one final pass at them in August 1988, well after we had begun our preliminary data analysis.
Even at that late date, some three to five years after the remand, we found that a certain number of
cases remained in one or both of these categories. We dropped these from the dataset, at least as far
as our analyses of post-remand events and evaluation of outcomes were concerned.
990 [Vol. 1990:984
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In order to learn what had transpired after each of the roughly 180
cases during the 1984-85 period was remanded by a court of appeals to
the agency for further proceedings, we conducted interviews by tele-
phone (and occasionally in person) with the lawyer who represented the
agency and with the lawyer who represented the petitioner. 18 Those in-
terviews were designed to elicit data bearing upon two "facts" that could
not always be resolved by attempting to integrate the lawyers' differing
perceptions-the specific post-remand events (about which there was sel-
dom much disagreement between the opposing lawyers), and the parties'
evaluation of the outcomes (about which disagreement was more
common). 19
Our final objective explains why we defined and divided the 1985
period as precisely as we did. By doing so, we hoped to learn how the
Court's Chevron decision, as clarified and reaffirmed eight months later
in Chemical Manufacturers Association v. NRDC, 20 had affected appel-
late court review of agency action. We discuss the changes in legal doc-
trine wrought by Chevron in more detail subsequently; 21 for the moment
it suffices to say that in Chevron, the Supreme Court sent a strong signal
to the courts of appeals that they should be more deferential in reviewing
interpretations of statutes by administrative agencies. Even before we
initiated our study, Chevron had occasioned a great deal of published
commentary. Most of these commentators viewed (and often de-
nounced) the decision as a watershed administrative law ruling that
would encourage reviewing courts to defer to agency interpretations and
policy directions. If true, this change would slow, if not reverse, the
trend toward more intrusive judicial review that had gathered force dur-
ing the preceding two decades.22 In order to test the accuracy of these
18. At the written request of the ACUS, each federal agency identified a contact person within
the agency (usually in the general counsel's office) who would help to facilitate the data-gathering for
the study. The identity of the agency's and petitioner's lawyers often was obtainable from the pub-
lished opinions, as well.
We generally sought to interview the most junior lawyer listed. Our assumption that this would
be the lawyer closest to, and most knowledgeable about, the details of the case generally proved to be
correct. Sometimes, of course, the lawyers who were in the best position to answer our questions
were no longer employed by the agency or firm. In those cases, the interviewer attempted to locate
that lawyer, and when that effort failed, the interviewer almost always was able to obtain the desired
information from someone else in the agency or law firm who was (or after reviewing the file could
become) familiar with the matter.
19. We explain how we handled this problem infra Part III(D), "What Happens After
Remand?"
20. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
21. See infra Part m(C), "Remands and the Chevron Effect."
22. See infra Part HI(B)(1), "The Outcomes of Judicial Review."
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predictions, we read cases covering the six-month period preceding Chev-
ron and the six-month period following Chemical Manufacturers. 23
For purposes of managing and analyzing our dataset, we initially
divided it into seven subsets of cases, each with its own computerized
data file. These seven files were: (1) the 1965 cases (remand and non-
remand);24 (2) the 1974-75 cases (remand and non-remand); 25 (3) the
1984 non-remand cases (those which an appellate court had disposed of
without remanding them to the agency); (4) the 1984 remand cases
(those which an appellate court had, in the first instance, remanded to
the agency for further proceedings); 26 (5) the 1985 non-remand cases; (6)
the 1985 remand cases;27 and (7) the 1988 cases.28 To facilitate those
analyses for which the distinctions between remand and non-remand
cases, or between pre-Chevron and post-Chevron cases were not relevant,
we then aggregated the 1984 and 1985 cases by creating (8) a merged file
of all 1984 cases; (9) a merged fie of all 1985 cases; and (10) a file further
combining all these merged files. These ten files contained data that had
been generated in two ways: by analysis of the published opinions (from
all 1965 and 1974-75 cases as well as the 1984-85 non-remand cases), and
by opinion analysis plus subsequent telephone interviews (for the 1984
and 1985 remand cases). 29
The 1676 appellate cases from the 1984-85 period that we analyzed
were generated in the first instance by almost fifty different administra-
23. Although this means that we actually read cases coveringfive time periods, we treat the two
six-month periods during 1985 as a single time period for purposes other than that of analyzing the
effects of Chevron.
2,. The 1965 sample covered cases decided during the six-month period between January 1,
1965 and June 30, 1965.
25. The 1974-75 sample covered cases decided during the six-month period between October
15, 1974 and April 15, 1975. The latter date was selected as the cut-off date in order to immediately
precede the Supreme Court's decision on April 16, 1975 in Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), a
case that anticipated Chevron in mandating deference to agency constructions of statutes.
26. The 1984 sample (both non-remand and remand cases) covered cases decided during the
six-month period between December 25, 1983 and June 25, 1984, the day Chevron was decided.
27. The 1985 sample (both non-remand and remand cases) covered cases decided during the
six-month period between February 28, 1985 (the day after Chemical Manufacturers was decided)
and August 31, 1985.
28. The 1988 sample covered cases decided during the two-month period between March 1,
1988 and April 30, 1988.
29. These data had been recorded by the researchers on individual coding sheets, one for each
case. The final coding sheet, which is reproduced as Appendix B, differs from several earlier ver-
sions, but only slightly. The changes were made in order to: (1) add some items of information that
could be adduced entirely from analysis of the published opinions (e.g., item AA relating to the
standard of review); (2) refine some of the data categories (e.g., item K relating to the number of
judges; item N relating to the result code); (3) correct obvious errors; and (4) permit computer
programming. A coding key also was prepared to facilitate the uniform coding of the data.
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tive agencies. 30 Among other things, we hoped to learn whether different
agencies generated different patterns of appellate review and handled re-
mands differently. We found it useful to group the agencies analytically
for two reasons. First, a relatively few agencies accounted for a high
proportion of the cases studied, whereas the great majority of agencies
produced very few.3' Thus, analyzing the agencies individually often
would preclude statistically significant findings, while grouping them into
larger clusters might avoid this problem. Second, we believed that cer-
tain groupings would help us to discern broad patterns that might other-
wise remain obscured. Accordingly, we allocated each agency in our
dataset to one of nine agency groups. 32
The case analyses, interviews, and data recordation were performed
under our supervision from early 1987 to March 1989 by a group of law
students at Georgetown and then at Yale, each of whom had completed a
basic course in administrative law. 33 Once the data had been gathered,
30. The number of agencies was smaller during the two earlier periods covered by the study,
partly because fewer appellate cases were decided during those periods and partly because there were
fewer agencies at that time. Because of the temporal parameters of our dataset, some relatiVely low-
volume agencies (e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Commission) do not have any cases in the
dataset.
31. Three sources of agency cases--the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (sometimes
through the Board of Immigration Appeals)-together accounted for approximately 57% of the
cases decided during the 1984-85 study period. Before the creation of the MSPB in 1978, the NLRB
generated the most cases, accounting for 31.7% of the total in 1965 and 41.5% in 1975.
32. We formed these groups and assigned particular agencies to them on the basis of a combi-
nation of analytical criteria and the frequency with which certain agencies appeared in our dataset.
The groups are: (1) the National Labor Relations Board, (2) health, safety and environment regula-
tory agencies; (3) other regulatory agencies; (4) the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Board of Immigration Appeals; (5) the Merit Systems Protection Board, which by far accounted for
the largest number of cases (27.5% in the 1984-85 period); (6) the Department of Labor; (7) execu-
tive departments other than the Department of Labor;, (8) the Patent Office; and (9) all other agen-
cies. The agencies included in each group are listed in Appendix A. These designations are arbitrary
in the sense that they represent only one of the many ways in which the caseload could have been
sliced. The labels used for some of these groups are also crude. Thus, for example, the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion, which are included in group (2), are not really regulatory agencies. Furthermore, although the
Federal Aviation Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration certainly
fit well in this group, we coded them instead to the Departments of Transportation and Labor,
respectively.
33. We took a number of precautions to satisfy ourselves that the students' analyses of the
published opinions and their coding of the data were reasonably accurate and uniform.
Most of the data collected from the published opinions was objective and straightforward in
nature and there was little risk of error. Only two pieces of data in the opinions required some
exercise of judgment in coding: the type of agency proceeding (item M on the coding sheet) and-a
more difficult characterization-the reasons for remand (item N).
In order to achieve a high level of uniformity in characterizing the type of agency proceeding,
we reviewed with the students the differences between adjudication, rulemaking, and ratemaking,
and discussed the kinds of agency actions that might fall into the "other" category. We then in-
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coded, and error corrected, they were entered into a computer and pre-
liminarily analyzed.
We, like all teachers and practitioners of administrative law, did not
come to the subject without preconceptions. Indeed, we began our work
with a variety of beliefs about what we would find and expectations that
ranged from weak intuitions to firm convictions. These formed the basis
for a number of preliminary hypotheses concerning a range of adminis-
trative law phenomena that we hoped our results would illuminate.
Most of these hypotheses--and certainly the more important ones, from
our point of view-relate to judicial remands. They concern, for exam-
ple, how court size, agency type, proceeding type, and other such vari-
ables affect remands; how agencies respond to various kinds of remands;
how long different administrative proceedings take to complete; and how
structed each of the students to read a random sample of cases, classify the type of agency proceed-
ing involved in each, and bring any disputed classifications to us, whereupon we met as a group and
resolved the few disputes in a way that further clarified the categories for the students.
Characterizing the reasons for remands was more difficult and we therefore felt obliged to be
even more circumspect. First, we instructed all students to read a classic article by the late Judge
Henry Friendly elaborating the taxonomy of remands that we had found useful and wished to em-
ploy in the study. See Friendly, Chenery Revested: Reflections on Reversal and Remand ofAdminfs-
trative Orders; 1969 DuKE L. 199. We then discussed that taxonomy as a group at some length.
Before permitting the students to read any of the cases to be covered by the study, we asked each of
them to read and to complete coding sheets for an identical random sample of cases. They were then
to meet among themselves to discuss any instances in which some or all of them had classified
differently the reasons for a particular remand. After that, we met as a group to discuss those
differences as well as any uncertainties that remained. We also encouraged the students to raise with
us any questions that might arise when they analyzed the cases covered by the study, and we re-
solved those questions in weekly meetings that both of us and all of the students (with occasional
exceptions) attended. After the students had completed all of the case analyses and coding sheets,
we asked a lawyer with extensive administrative law experience in a federal agency to review for
accuracy each of the cases and the students' coding sheets, making changes where appropriate. In
addition, we reviewed each of the cases and coding sheets as to which the lawyer had raised any
question, and we made the appropriate changes.
The authors adopted two additional reliability checks that should be standard procedure for
studies of this kind. First, we each read several volumes of the Federal Reporter and checked our
codings of the cases against those that the research assistants had compiled, going over any discrep-
ancies with them in order to resolve any apparent misapprehensions. Second, we generated a list of
key words and phrases that could be the basis for a computerized search for the cases that should be
in our datasets. We then tested the reliability of this search technique by comparing its outputs to
the cases contained in the relevant volumes of the Federal Reporter, enabling us to refine further the
list of key words and phrases. Because this technique holds much promise for future research of this
kind, we describe it in some detail in Appendix C.
Coding the data generated by the telephone interviews usually required only that the students
accurately transcribe what the lawyers told them, not that they exercise independent judgment. The
opposing lawyers seldom told them inconsistent things and when they did, the students simply re-
corded those differences on the coding sheet.
Given the large number of cases in the dataset and the limited experience of the students, we
suspect that even these precautions failed to detect some errors. Nevertheless, we believe that the
number of such errors cannot be large enough to affect the general conclusions that we have reached
from our analysis.
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these relationships have changed over time. Our dataset, however, also
enabled us to cast some light upon the evolution of certain other features
of administrative law. These features, which are not specific to judicial
remands, include the "style" of judicial opinions and some of the institu-
tional structures within which administrative law is generated. When we
discuss our findings and analysis in Part III, we briefly note these hy-
potheses and our reasons for initially viewing them as plausible.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the findings and analysis, we
wish to emphasize what the earlier description of our methodology
should have made clear: Much of our data is in aggregated form. To be
sure, we have disaggregated it in many forms-by agency, circuit, pro-
ceeding type, court size, time period, and disposition on appeal (itself
broken down into several categories and subcategories). Still, our classi-
fication of the cases remains aggregated in some respects and irreducibly
impressionistic. Its analytical categories are gleaned from the face of the
opinions themselves, from the content of those opinions, or (in the case of
the discussion of post-remand events) from information obtained from
lawyers. We are acutely aware that these variables do not capture all, or
even most, of the factors that explain why reviewing courts and agencies
decide as they do. The list of other factors that also powerfully shape
their decisions would surely be a long one. It would certainly include the
following elements: the political environment in which the agency oper-
ates; the quality of the agency's personnel and lawyering, as well as the
resources of private parties challenging the agency; the legal culture sur-
rounding the agency; the respect with which the agency is held by liti-
gants and reviewing courts; the agency's technical competence; the
agency's statutory framework; and other similar factors.34
Although identifying such factors unquestionably would help one to
predict and to explain agency and reviewing court behavior, we do not
discuss them much here because they are tangential to our purposes.
Our intention has not been to analyze the behavior of particular agencies
or reviewing courts (although we have devoted some attention to trends
in the D.C. Circuit). Instead, our purposes have been to uncover broad
patterns and general trends in administrative law and, with respect to our
discussion of Chevron, to gauge how an unusually controversial adminis-
trative law decision of the Supreme Court actually has affected reviewing
34. To cite just one example, Professor Linda Hirshman notes that the fact that NLRB orders
have no effect until they are enforced by a circuit court "creates a culture among labor lawyers of
considering all NLRB orders as very tentative, [which] would have a big effect on the statistics
throughout [this study]. They should be resisted much more often and reversed ... more often."
Letter from L. Hirshman to E. Donald Elliott (Jan. 18, 1990) (available from authors).
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court (and, indirectly, agency) behavior. Our data, we think, are fully
appropriate to those goals.
III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Our findings can be analyzed usefully under four rubrics, which or-
ganize the four sections in Part III. In the first, "The Changing Style of
Appellate Opinions," we consider the ways in which judicial opinions
have changed between 1965 and 1985. In particular, our data permit us
to describe (1) the role of "table decisions"; (2) patterns relating to the
length and footnoting of opinions; and (3) the fragmentation of decisions
by reviewing courts as reflected in the filing of separate opinions. Our
purposes in this section are not merely descriptive; the data also shed
light upon various hypotheses about some larger themes and underlying
trends in administrative law.
In the second section, "The Ages of Administrative Law," we con-
sider how certain structural and behavioral features of administrative law
changed between 1965 and 1985. These features include: (1) the out-
comes of judicial review; (2) the types of agency proceedings subject to
judicial review; (3) the agency composition of the administrative law
caseload in the circuit courts; (4) the size and distribution among circuit
courts of that caseload; and (5) the composition of the reviewing courts.
In the third section, "Remands and the Chevron Effect," we con-
sider the patterns of reviewing courts' decisions to remand cases to the
agencies. In particular, we (1) describe these patterns according to
agency, circuit court, and type of remand; (2) analyze whether and to
what extent the Supreme Court's Chevron decision in 1984 affected the
circuit courts' disposition of cases in general and their use of particular
kinds of remands in particular; (3) discuss whether these effects persisted
into 1988; and (4) analyze the effects on particular agencies.
In the fourth section, "What Happens After Remand?," we consider
how agencies respond to remands and how those remands affect the out-
come and duration of agency cases. The data that we present there are
undeniably impressionistic and subjective. Nonetheless, we are aware of
no other systematic effort to inquire into these obviously crucial
questions.
A. The Changing Style of Appellate Opinions
Between 1965 and 1985, administrative law became more complex
and technical. The number of administrative agencies and circuit courts
proliferated. American society became more diverse and thus more diffi-
cult to regulate. Agency statutes imposed more detailed substantive and
996 [Vol. 1990:984
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procedural requirements. Rulemaking joined adjudication as a promi-
nent mode of agency decisionmaking. The records compiled in the
agency proceedings became longer and more technical. An ethos of pub-
lic participation led to the expansion of traditional judicial remedies
against agencies and the creation of new ones.35 The sheer volume of
cases rose substantially, necessitating more judges and burdening court
dockets. This larger body of precedent, however, settled relatively few
issues; as is often true, judicial decisions tended to raise as many ques-
tions as they answered.
Of all the changes in the landscape of administrative law over the
past two decades, perhaps the most dramatic is the growing caseload.
The number of administrative law cases decided on the merits by the
federal courts of appeals has risen steadily, more than tripling over two
decades, from 489 cases in 1965 to more than 1567 cases in 1987. (See
Chart 1.)
The number of appeals from administrative action filed in the fed-
eral courts of appeals has grown by a similar proportion, also almost
tripling between 1965 and 1985, from 1106 cases filed annually in 1965 to
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3179 filings in 1985. (See Chart 2.) Although the growth in the adminis-
trative caseload has indeed been dramatic, its effect should not be over-
stated. During the same period, the caseload of the courts of appeals in
other areas grew even more rapidly. Thus, despite substantial growth in
the absolute number of direct appeals from administrative action, those
cases actually constitute a much smaller percentage of the total business
of the federal courts of appeals today than they did just two decades ago.
Administrative appeals comprised only about 7% of filings in the courts
of appeals in 1987, less than one-half of the 16% of the caseload that they
accounted for in 1965. (See Chart 2.)
In short, two trends that move in opposite directions are at work
simultaneously. The total body of administrative law is increasing rap-
idly, but administrative law appeals constitute a very small and ever-
shrinking portion of the workload of individual circuit judges. The com-
bination of these two factors raises serious questions about the opportu-
nity for appellate judges today to develop substantial experience in
handling administrative law cases. 36
36. The D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit are striking exceptions to these generalizations:
Administrative law appeals continue to comprise a significant fraction of their caseloads, thus per-
mitting their members to acquire and maintain administrative law expertise. See infra text accompa.
nying notes 79-84.
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These changes were bound to affect the ways in which appellate
judges went about deciding agency cases. But it was not at all obvious
precisely how they would adapt to the more complex disputes that in-
creasingly arose before them. Some responses were readily predictable.
Other things being equal, for example, busy judges needing to dispose of
a larger caseload would probably employ more panel and fewer en banc
decisions.
But other responses were less certain because the pressures for
change sometimes pushed the courts in conflicting directions. On the
one hand, for example, one might suppose that judges pressed for time
would feel constrained to write shorter opinions. On the other hand, one
might also anticipate that the presence of more complex cases would
make it more difficult for the judges to secure agreement among them-
selves. Similarly, their need to accommodate diverse views, coupled with
the analytical demands posed by massive, technical administrative
records, would lead them to write longer opinions, file more separate
ones, and use more footnotes. The growth in the number of judicial
clerks during this period might also encourage these developments.
We expected that these competing tendencies would be particularly
strong in several situations: (1) in the D.C. Circuit, whose administrative
law caseload is larger and is generally considered to be both more com-
plex and more controversial than those of the other circuits;37 (2) in
rulemaking and ratemaking proceedings, which are usually more far-
reaching than adjudications and generate more extensive, technical ad-
ministrative records; (3) in en banc proceedings, which involve more
judges and tend to be reserved for the most important cases; and (4) in
cases involving health, safety, and environmental agencies, which also
often generate extensive, technical records and are politically controver-
sial. As we shall discuss in later parts of this section, our data bear out
some of these expectations, but not others.
1. Table Decisions. Even before we began our analysis of the
data, one development fairly leaped off the pages of the Federal Reporter.
For many of the administrative law (and other) cases decided by the cir-
37. See, ag., Robinson, The D.C. Circuit An Era of Chang, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 715, 716
(1978) (one-fourth of all federal agency reviews reach the D.C. Circuit, far more than in any other
circuit); The Contribution of the D.C Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADmvN. L. Rnv. 507 (1988)
(transcript of a program presented at the ABA Section of Administrative Law Fall meeting in Octo-
ber 1987 on the special and increasing significance of the D.C. Circuit as the ultimate decisionmaker
for most agency decisions; in 1986, the D.C. Circuit received 30% of all agency appeals). This view
is buttressed by statutory provisions locating venue for certain types of important disputes in the
D.C. Circuit. Eg., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988) (challenges to nationally applicable Clean Air Act
regulations).
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cuit courts, the Reporter publishes "table decisions" containing only min-
imal information: the names of the lead petitioner and respondent; the
docket number; the date and disposition of the appellate court decision;
and the forum (agency or court) from which the appeal was taken. De-
pending upon the local rules of particular circuits, the courts that issue
these "table decisions" may or may not provide brief memoranda opin-
ions to the parties, but these memoranda are not published in the Re-
porter. 38 Thus, if one looks only at the information published in the table
decision itself, one can learn neither the nature of the dispute nor the
reasons supporting the disposition. The opacity of these table decisions
and the courts' increasing resort to this practice have received some criti-
cal commentary during the recent years when its use has grown most
rapidly.39 The use of table decisions is an important phenomenon that
raises fundamental questions about judicial practice and legal process.4
These questions deserve detailed consideration, but most of them are
outside the scope of this project.
During the period covered by our study, these table decisions have
come to dominate appellate courts' disposition of all types of cases, in-
cluding those arising from administrative agencies. The origins of the
38. In the mid-1980s, some of the circuits began providing memoranda and opinions underly-
ing these decisions to WESTLAW and LEXIS.
39. See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts
of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 573 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman,
An Evaluation]; Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government
Litigants in the United States Court ofAppeals 87 MICH. L. REv. 940 (1989); Comment, Unreported
Decisions in the US. Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128 (1978); see also Judge Wald's
separate statement in National Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 172-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); D. STIENSTMA, UNPUBLISHED DmsposmoNs: PROBLEMS Op AccEss AND USE IN THE
CouRis oF APPEALS (1985); Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205,
218-23 (1985).
There also has been criticism of rules in some circuits that permit a party to request publication
of an opinion. Eg., Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1179 & n.72
(1978). There has been somewhat more commentary on the impact of publication rules in particular
circuits. See Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979
DUKE L.J. 807 (analyzing the approaches of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in limiting publication
and evaluating the plan's efficiency in relation to the risks involved in nonpublication); Comment, A
Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. Pri. L. REv. 309
(1977) (arguing that the federal circuit courts have attempted to promote judicial efficiency by intro-
ducing publication plans which permit some judgments without opinions).
For commentary on the impact of limited publication in state courts of appeals, see Andreani,
Independent Panels to Choose Publishable Opinions: A Solution to the Problems of California's Selec-
tive Publication System. 12 PAc. LJ. 727 (1981); Newbern & Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the,
Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REv. 37 (1978); Render, On Unpublished Opinions, 73 Ky. L.J. 145
(1984-85).
40. In the D.C. Circuit, at least, unpublished opinions have no precedential effect except upon
the parties to that litigation. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 871 F.2d 149, 150 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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practice of disposing of appeals via unpublished orders or short, unpub-
lished memoranda are somewhat murky. In 1964, the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States formally endorsed the practice in a
recommendation that the federal courts should authorize "the publica-
tion of only those opinions which are of general precedential value."41
By 1965, a significant number of administrative law cases probably were
disposed of by unpublished order or opinion. Unfortunately, we have
been unable to determine exactly how many unpublished dispositions oc-
curred in 1965, because at that time the Federal Reporter gave no indica-
tion that cases had been disposed of by unpublished order or
memorandum. Between 1966 and 1974, each of the circuits promulgated
a circuit publication plan, and in 1972 West Publishing Co. began to
publish tables in the Federal Reporter listing the cases that had been dis-
posed of by unpublished order or memorandum, in what we call "table
decisions."4 2 In 1974, the Judicial Conference approved each of the cir-
cuit's publication plans, which varied in regard to both publication crite-
ria and citation rules.43
The practice of disposing of cases through table decisions caught on
quickly. In our 1975 sample of cases, almost 29% were table decisions.
A decade later, almost 60% of our (much larger) sample were table deci-
sions. (See Chart 3.) Indeed, the move toward using table decisions
rather than published opinions to decide the bulk of their cases may well
have been the courts' major institutional response to their burgeoning
caseload. This development also parallels (and presumably interacts
with) a trend toward longer published opinions. Table 1, which follows,
displays the differences in outcomes between published opinions and ta-
ble cases.44
41. Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 39, at 577 (quoting THE REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1974)).
42. 467 F.2d 943-44 (1972). In this connection, West exercises no discretion, but simply in-
cludes in the tables all decisions that are submitted to it by the circuits for publication.
In 1973, the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice of the Federal Judicial Center published
Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions, which urged that each unpublished opinion should
contain the results and reasoning and explain the results to the appellate court in order to facilitate
review. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDs FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL
OPINIONS (Research Series No. 73-2) (1973).
43. Although this diversity was viewed as a source of useful experimentation, the Conference
has not subsequently reexamined the issue. THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNrrED STATES 12-13 (1974).
44. It should be noted that the numbers and percentages of cases presented in Table I and in
subsequent tables and in the text may reflect some double counting, as when a case was coded both
"affirmed in part" and "other." As the tables indicate, the frequency of such double counting was
very low. For this reason, we are confident that such double counting did not significantly affect any
of the findings that we report.
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For much of the analysis that follows, it matters a great deal
whether table decisions are or are not included in the dataset. Because
table decisions provide no information as to the court's reasoning, we
expected that the overwhelming majority of these decisions would be af-
firmances and that there would be virtually no reversals or remands.
We were wrong. By the 1984-85 period, the courts' use of table
decision dispositions had become so common that we found thirty-seven
table decisions that were outright reversals and fifty-two that were re-
mands to the agencies. These reversals constituted 3.7%, and remands
constituted 5.2%, of the 997 table decisions contained in our dataset.
Together, these eighty-nine cases represented 5.3% of all cases (opinions
and tables) in our dataset for that period. In our 1988 sample, 4.8% of
all cases were reversals and remands taking the form of table decisions.45
Because table decisions are used so frequently and are not confined
to affirmances, we felt constrained to analyze much of the data in two
ways-including and excluding table decisions. In reporting the results,
then, we make reference to the effect of table decisions on the specific
45. According to one study, almost 25% of the circuit court decisions reversing, vacating, or
denying a lower court decision were unpublished; the figure for the Sixth Circuit was 41.9%. D.
STmNSTRA, supra note 39, at 42 (Table 3).
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Opinion Table All# % # % #*
Affirmed 96 34.7% 72 26.0% 168 60.6%
Reversed 62 22.4% 4 1.4% 66 23.8%
Remanded 41 14.8% 1 0.4% 42 15.2%
Other 5 1.8% 2 0.7% 7 2.5%


































variable where the results would appear to differ significantly depending
upon whether they are included or excluded.
2. The Length and Footnoting of Opinions. In order to test cer-
tain hypotheses about the writing style of judicial opinions, the complex-
ity of administrative law issues, and the degree of reviewing court
fragmentation, we coded each opinion according to its length and
number of footnotes. These two variables amount to very crude46 indices
that could reveal any trends toward greater judicial prolixity, issue corn-
46. We have no doubt that superior indices could be used. The great virtue of ours, of course,
is that they are easily measured and coded. This is an example of the unfortunate but inevitable
reality that methodological constraints often drive and shape the analysis.
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plexity, documentation of evidence, and precedential significance that
might exist. Because we believe that these issues are of only secondary
interest, we have decided to report our conclusions in summary fashion
here; we present a more complete discussion of the data in Appendix D.
In brief, we found that the D.C. Circuit writes longer, more heavily
footnoted opinions than the other circuits do; that this disparity has in-
creased since 1975; that the average opinion among all circuits was much
shorter in 1985 than in 1975 if table decisions are included, and was
about the same length if they are excluded; that rulemaking and ratemak-
ing opinions are longer and more heavily footnoted than adjudication
opinions; that (contrary to our expectation) law-based remands are gen-
erally shorter and less heavily footnoted than other kinds of remands;
that (again, contrary to our expectation) en banc decisions are shorter
and less heavily footnoted than three-judge court decisions; and that
courts reviewing health, safety, and environmental agencies write longer,
more heavily footnoted opinions than courts that review most other
kinds of agencies.
3. The Fragmentation of Decisions. Our data seemed especially
useful for testing the "increased divisiveness" hypothesis. Many observ-
ers-most notably the former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit herself-
have commented on the pronounced ideological shift that occurred on
that court after the confirmation of three "conservative" Reagan appoin-
tees in 1982 and 1983. 47 If these appointments did affect outcomes, then
their effect might be captured in a comparison of our 1975 dataset, which
preceded the appointments, with our 1985 dataset, which followed the
last of them by several months.48 More fundamentally, however, the di-
visiveness of a court may be defined in terms of its propensity to write
separate opinions.49 In measuring this propensity, we wished to avoid
47. See Wald, RebelAngel in Flight, DISTRIcr LAW., July/August 1986, at 30, 32; Pierce, Two
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial
Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking 1988 DUKE LJ. 300, 303-17 (discussing ideology in the D.C.
Circuit). Judges Bork, Scalia, and Starr were the Reagan appointees during the period preceding our
1984-85 dataset. But see Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging: Dis-
pelling Some Myths About the D.C Circuit 56 U. COLo. L. REv. 619 (1985).
48. The last, Judge Star, was appointed about three months before our 1984 case sample be-
gan, and the court's membership then remained unchanged until well after our 1985 sample ended.
49. For prior discussions of the issue of fragmentation and divisiveness in judicial opinions, see
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticising the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 802 (1982); Easterbrook, Agreement
Among the Justice An Empirical Note. 1984 Sup. Cr. REv. 389. In analyzing divisiveness, we
counted the number of separate opinions, which has the advantage of being an objective measure,
but gives the same weight to concurring and dissenting opinions. Although in some cases dissents
may reflect a greater degree of division on the court than concurrences, we believe that the number
of separate opinions is the best measure of divisiveness. The only other possible measure of divisive-
ness that our data could exploit is the number of footnotes in the court's opinion(s). Because the
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HeinOnline -- 1990 Duke L.J. 1004 1990
Vol. 1990:984] TO THE CHEVRON STATION 1005
several potentially distorting effects of including table decisions in our
analysis,50 yet we did not wish to exclude them altogether. For if it is
true that the more divided a court is, the less likely it will be to issue table
decisions, then data on table decisions might enrich, rather than detract
from, our analysis of divisiveness in different circuits and over time.
For similar reasons, we could not very well draw inferences about
court divisiveness without considering the additional variable of court
size. Simple logic strongly suggests that the number of judges who sit on
a case is directly related to the number of opinions per case that will be
written. This would be true, moreover, even if court size were not inde-
pendently related to divisiveness-that is, even if the most controversial
cases were not the ones most likely to be heard en banc.51 Our data
confirm this relationship between the number of judges and the number
of opinions per case; the correlation was present in all periods, and was
especially strong in the most recent one.52
When we measure divisiveness (or its opposite, consensus) by the
average number of opinions per case, we find (not surprisingly) that in all
periods, the more divisive the case is, the longer and more heavily foot-
noted the opinions are.53 When we analyze divisiveness nationally (that
is, aggregating all circuits) and over time, and we exclude table decisions,
we find that the proportion of one-opinion cases actually increased be-
tween 1965 and 1975 (from about 81% to 87%) and then remained at
relationship between the number of footnotes and the degree of divisiveness is weak, ambiguous, and
speculative, however, we simply mention it briefly here.
50. Because table decisions invariably involve only one opinion, courts' use of them operates to
reduce the average number of opinions per case. This could produce distortion if, for reasons having
nothing to do with divisiveness, their use increased over time or if different circuits use them in
different proportions. In fact, different circuits do use table cases in different proportions, and those
proportions have changed over time. In 1975, when 28.5% of the cases were table decisions, the
major users of table decisions on a percentage basis were the First (75%) and Fourth (64%) Circuits,
with four other circuits (the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and the Court of Claims) clustering around
20%. In 1984-85, when the proportion more than doubled to about 59%, the frequency of use
among the circuits produced a very different pattern.
51. As we have just seen, court size does not always correlate with longer opinions and more
footnotes. These findings are surprising, at least if one assumes that cases that courts schedule to
hear en bane tend to be more divisive (a proposition that we believe, but on which we have no data)
or more important, that more divisive and important cases produce longer and more heavily foot-
noted decisions (a proposition that we substantiate immediately below with respect to divisiveness,
see infra note 53 and accompanying text).
52. In 1984-85, en bane courts wrote twice as many opinions per case as three-judge panels, a
much higher ratio than in the previous time periods.
53. Perhaps more interesting-but limited by the small number of three-opinion cases in the
samples-is the observation that the footnoting seems to increase geometrically as divisiveness grows
from two to three opinions per case. In 1984-85, for example, one-opinion non-table cases (593)
averaged six footnotes, two-opinion cases (86) averaged a total (for both opinions) of 10 footnotes,
and three-opinion cases (only nine) averaged a total of 41 footnotes.
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essentially the same level in 1984-85. Since table decisions are almost by
definition unanimous, and because their use has increased markedly over
time, including them in the analysis would greatly strengthen this al-
ready discernible trend toward more consensus in the circuit courts
(when those courts are viewed in the aggregate).
Viewing the D.C. Circuit in isolation does not really alter this con-
clusion; indeed, that court exhibits an even stronger trend toward greater
consensus-at least through the period covered by our 1984-85 dataset.
Excluding table decisions, the proportion of one-opinion decisions in the
D.C. Circuit increased from about 70% in 1965 to over 75% in 1975,
and then (contrary to the trend in the aggregated circuits) the rate fur-
ther increased to almost 81% in 1984-85. When we take table decisions
into account, the consensus in the D.C. Circuit is even greater: In the
1984-85 period, 86.5% of its decisions involved only one opinion,
whereas 13.5% involved two or more opinions (three times the percent-
age in all other circuits viewed in the aggregate). This trend becomes
even more striking when it is understood that the D.C. Circuit's share of
the national total of table decisions actually declined sharply between
1975 and 1984-85-from over 27% to under 7%,54 thus negating any
possibility that the inclusion of table decisions (which are unanimous)
inflated our consensus measure arbitrarily.55
Our data thus seem to refute the strong impression among commen-
tators that "political polarity" 56 on the D.C. Circuit grew during the dec-
ade after 1975. It is true that consensus on that court has always been
low relative to almost all other circuit courts; during all periods covered
by the study, its consensus level was lower than the national average,
which in the most recent period was over 86%.57 It is also possible that
the court's divisiveness did increase significantly after 1984-85, when ad-
54. The lion's share of this decline in the D.C. Circuit's share of the national total between 1974
and 1984-85 was picked up by the Federal Circuit. In 1981, the Federal Circuit not only acquired
the jurisdictions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and the Court of Claims, but also
became the exclusive venue for all patent appeals. In 1975, the shares of its two predecessor courts
were only about 5%.
55. The argument would be that a court's use of the table decision device, although largely
signaling collegial consensus, might in some cases be used purely as a way to enable an overburdened
court to deal with caseload pressures. In those cases, so the argument would run, the unanimity of
the table decision really reflects an exigent, artificial consensus, not a real one.
56. See Pierce, supra note 47.
57. The D.C. Circuit, however, was not the only court below the national average. During
each period, there was at least one other circuit whose consensus level was either lower than or
approximately the same as the D.C. Circuit's. In 1965, the First Circuit and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals were in this position; in 1975, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits; and in 1984-85,
the Third and Eighth Circuits.
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ditional Reagan appointees joined the courts" and several older Demo-
cratic appointees holding senior status, including Chief Judge David
Bazelon, died or retired.5 9 All we can say with some assurance is that
this increased divisiveness, if present at any time, was not observable in
the 1984-85 cases.
B. The Ages of Administrative Law
1. The Outcomes of Judicial Review. Before this study began, we
believed (along with most other administrative lawyers, we suspect) that
judicial review of administrative action was deferential in the 1960s, that
it became more stringent during the "hard look" era in the 1970s, and
then settled back to a moderately deferential stance during the 1980s.60
We also shared the common belief that these putative trends would be
exhibited most conspicuously by the D.C. Circuit.
This picture of the "ages of administrative law" is now part of the
shared professional culture of administrative lawyers. 61 It is one of our
shibboleths, a conventional truth that knowledgeable lawyers repeat to
one another and teach the next generation. One goal of our study was to
explore whether this conventional picture of the changing nature of judi-
cial review was accurate. We discovered that because of the distorting
effect of table decisions, it was difficult to form an accurate judgment
about even so fundamental an issue as the likelihood that appellate courts
would overturn administrative decisions on judicial review solely by rely-
ing on the public record of decisions published in the Federal Reporter.
That said, our analysis of published decisions from 1965, 1975, and
1984-85, as exhibited in Table 2, does show a consistent trend toward an
increasing percentage of affirmances.
Chart 4 shows a long-term trend toward increasing rates of affir-
mances by courts in administrative law cases, from 55.1% in 1965, to
58. Judges Silberman, Buckley, Williams, Douglas Ginsburg, and Sentellejoined the court be-
tween 1985 and 1987.
59. Senior Judges McGowan and Bazelon, both Democratic appointees, and Senior Judges
Robb and Wilkey, Republican appointees, left the court after 1985.
60. See, eg., Elliott, The Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro, 92
YALE LJ. 1523, 1530 (1983) ("As an historical matter, the high-water mark of judicial control of
administrative action was reached about a decade ago... [in] the middle 1970's .... ").
61. See, ag., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 35, at 35-36. Breyer and Stewart argue:
Basic public trust in the administrative process and the spirit of working partnership be-
tween agency and reviewing courts that had developed in the postwar period began to
disintegrate after 1965. The work of administrative agencies came under increasingly
sharp attack on several fronts, and courts began to impose more stringent and far-reaching
controls on the administrative process.
See also Stewart, supra note 16, at 1712-13 (because agencies are biased in favor of clients and
unresponsive to interest groups, courts have attempted to change the traditional model to check such
biases).
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TABLE 2: OuTcoMEs-Cm SQUARE TEST
1965
Observed Percent Expected (O-E)2/E
Affirmed 205 55.1% 258.16 10.95
Reversed 107 28.8% 55.40 48.07
Remanded 51 13.7% 44.50 0.95




Observed Percent Expected (O-E)2/E
Affirmed 168 60.6% 195.87 3.97
Reversed 66 23.8% 42.03 13.67
Remanded 42 15.2% 33.77 2.01



























16.81, p < .01]
60.6% in 1975, to 76.6% in 1984-85. There are corresponding decreases
in the rates of reversals and remands. These data contradict the conven-
tional wisdom, which would predict a higher rate of reversals and re-
mands in 1975 than in 1965 or 1984-85.
Based on an analysis of the opinions published in the Federal Re-
porter, we were prepared to conclude that the conventional wisdom was
wrong: According to our data, judicial review was not more stringent in
the middle-1970s, at least if by "stringency" one means the propensity of
the courts to reverse or remand rather than affirm. Indeed, our data tend
to understate affirmances and to overstate reversals and remands because
we coded a case as a reversal or remand if it was reversed or remanded
on any ground even if, as often occurs, the court affirmed on all but one
or a few issues and those issues were relatively minor ones. Data from
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) tell a different story
than the data in Chart 4 generated by our analysis of the bound
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volumes. 62 Chart 5 shows the AO data for terminations of administra-
tive law cases in the courts of appeals after hearing or submission for the
same years that we analyzed in Chart 4.
The largest disparity between these two datasets is for 1965. For
1965, we found only a 55% affirmance rate, whereas the AO data show a
75% affirmance rate. For 1975, our figures were much closer: We found
a 61% affirmance rate; the AO had a 70% affirmance rate. For 1984-85,
we were in almost total agreement: Our affirmance rate was 76.6%; the
AO's was 75.9%.
We think that these disparities largely reflect differences in the way
that we and the AO defined and generated the datasets. We discuss these
differences and their effects in Appendix E.
Strictly speaking, of course, the success rate of agencies in court says
nothing about the "stringency" of judicial review. Outcomes in the re-
viewing courts are a function of (at least) two variables-how much
courts are demanding, and how well agencies are conforming to the dic-
tates of the law. It is possible that today's courts are much more de-
manding than their predecessors of the 1960s and 1970s, but that
62. Professor Pierce, it should be noted, relies on the AO data for his assertions about the D.C.
Circuit's propensity to reverse and remand agency actions. Pierce, supra note 47, at 302 n.13.
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agencies have improved their performance even faster. Thus, agencies
may be "out ahead of the curve" of increasingly stringent judicial review.
There is probably some truth to this reading of the data. In some
areas, the law today is undeniably more demanding than it was in 1965.
An example of this phenomenon is the Administrative Procedure Act's
(APA) requirement that agencies provide notice and an opportunity for
public comment before changing a rule.63 In the 1960s, agencies rou-
tinely published short, vague notices in the Federal Register that pro-
vided little information about the factual basis for their actions." By the
early 1970s, courts had begun to require more detailed disclosure of the
underlying factual support for the agency's action, at least when there
was no compelling necessity to dispense with the opportunity for public
comment. 65 Agencies responded by providing more detailed disclosures
in their published notices to meet the higher standards, and courts began
once again to uphold agency notice provisions. 66 Today, courts seldom
63. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (1988).
64. See ,ag., J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMNISNRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALs 450 (2d ed. 1985).
65. See, eg., Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972) (setting aside changes
in Department of Transportation regulations because of inadequate notice).
66. See eg., United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding







0% 1965 1975 1985
Percent of admin. cases affirmed in toto
Data: Administrative Office U.S. Courts
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overturn an agency action for failure to comply with the APA's notice
and comment requirements. Although the rules are more stringent to-
day, they also are relatively clear and predictable, and agencies routinely
comply with them. The courts have practically gone out of the business
of imposing new procedural requirements on agencies. 67 Thus, there are
fewer occasions today for courts to reverse or remand agency actions on
rulemakings.
It appears, then, that it is not the absolute stringency of judicial re-
view that translates into reversals and remands, but rather an increasing
marginal stringency. This occurs when courts are changing the law but
agencies have not yet adapted their practices to the new regime. As the
administrative state has matured, courts and the agencies have come to
know one another better; the dictates of administrative law have become
clearer; and agencies have found it less difficult to satisfy reviewing
courts, at least in the overwhelming body of their caseload that does not
lie at the developing frontiers of the law.
The important point-and one on which our data and the AO data
are in strong agreement-is that petitioners who challenge administrative
decisions in court today confront a very low probability of success. In
ordinary civil litigation, there are strong reasons to believe that, other
things being equal, plaintiffs and defendants should each win about one-
half of the time when cases go to trial rather than settle.68 That rule,
however, does not hold true in administrative law because the agency
wins almost 90% of the time, while challengers win a little over 10% of
the time.69 This raises an interesting question: Why do petitioners who
face an almost certain chance of losing continue to file challenges to ad-
ministrative actions in ever-increasing numbers?
One explanation, we believe, is that the party challenging adminis-
trative action often has much to gain and very little to lose from judicial
67. See e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978) ('The
court should... not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to
impose upon the agency its own notion of what procedures are 'best' .... ).
68. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5
(1983) (mathematical model demonstrates that individual maximizing decisions of the parties will
create a strong bias for a 50% success rate for plaintiffs or appellants). But see Eisenberg, Testing
the Selection Effect" A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Test% 19 . LEGAL STUD. 337
(1990) (criticizing Priest-Klein methodology and rejecting their 50% hypothesis as a description of
all civil litigation).
69. See supra Table 1. The Priest-Klein theory is not inconsistent with this observation, for it
recognizes that "repeat players" (of which agencies are classic examples) will face different incen-
tives to litigate than adversaries whose play is not as repetitive. Priest & Klein, supra note 68, at 24-
29; see also Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REV. 95, 124 (1974) (examining the "layers of advantages" that different
classes of "haves" enjoy in litigation with a particular focus on those advantages that accrue to
"repeat players").
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review. In such cases it may be rational for affected parties to challenge
administrative action in court, even though they predict that their
chances of prevailing are now substantially less than fifty-fifty. The bal-
ance of costs and benefits from challenging agency action in court obvi-
ously varies from area to area. In deportation cases, for example, aliens
who file a petition for review obtain an automatic stay of deportation that
will forestall action for months or even years.70 Petitioners therefore
"win" in an important sense whether or not the court ultimately rejects
disposition of their legal claims. In labor cases, most NLRB orders can-
not be enforced against an employer or union until a circuit court issues
an order to that effect. Yet, other agencies operate under different formal
rules and practices concerning the time at which their orders become
effective and the circumstances under which stays pending appeal can be
obtained. The delay associated with remands can be an additional incen-
tive to appeal. Remands almost always occasion significant delay, as our
data, discussed in Part III(C), make plain. Measured conservatively, this
delay amounts to an average of sixteen months at the agency level alone
and exceeds four years in 10% of the cases.
Our data suggest still another explanation-that in general, parties
and their lawyers perceive the benefits from successfully challenging
agency action in court as large and the costs as small. Although the
percentage of petitioners who win remand or reversal of agency action in
court is low, the lawyers for those who win believe that their clients have
reaped large benefits in terms of actually changing the government's posi-
tion. By and large, surprisingly, the lawyers for the government concur.
As we describe in more detail subsequently,71 lawyers for petitioners and
agencies agree that "major changes" in the agency's position result in
approximately 40% of the cases that are remanded by courts. Yet the
costs that petitioners must incur in order to obtain these benefits seem
quite modest. Because the agency initiates additional procedures to re-
vise the administrative record in only 30% of the remands, the additional
legal cost of seeking judicial review of agency action in most cases ap-
pears to be relatively limited. Many (though not all) petitioners' lawyers
presumably need to do little more than revise the briefs already prepared
and filed at the agency level.
Before we undertook this study, we thought that judicial review of
administrative actions was probably a waste of time in a great many
cases. We now believe that it may be rational for petitioners to challenge
agency action in court even when they believe that the chances of success
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1988); see Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 76-77 & n.432 (1984).
71. See infra Part HI(D)(2), "Post-Remand Outcomes."
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are low. The costs of a challenge are relatively low, but the benefits can
be very large if the petitioners can obtain a delay or if their challenge
succeeds. Finally, however, the possibility that administrative lawyers













2. Types of Agency Proceedings. In the 1965 period, more than
93% of the agency proceedings reviewed by the federal courts of appeals
(347 out of 372) were adjudications. In 1975, the proportion of adjudica-
tions fell to about 60%, and by 1984-85 that share dropped to about
34%, or scarcely one-third of the agency proceedings. (See Chart 6.)
But the magnitude of this change during the latter two periods is over-
stated due to the large increase in the proportion of table decisions that
occurred at the same time. Because we were unable to code these deci-
72. There is some empirical evidence that lawyers are poor predictors of the outcomes of their
cases and tend to be over-confident concerning their chances of winning. See Loftus & Wagenaar,
Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28 JuRImETRICS J. 437 (1988).
1013Vol. 1990:984]
HeinOnline -- 1990 Duke L.J. 1013 1990
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
sions as to type of proceeding, 73 we excluded them from our analysis, but
we strongly suspect that they were disproportionately adjudications. 74
When we confined our analysis to those proceedings that we could
code as adjudications, rulemakings, or ratemakings, we still found that
the share of adjudications declined, although much less dramatically-
from about 98% in 1965 to about 87% in 1984-85. Limiting the sample
in this way, the shares of rulemakings and ratemakings rose from 0.3%
and 1.4%, respectively, in 1965 to about 7% and about 5% in 1975-a
more than twenty-fold increase in the case of rulemaking. Rulemakings
declined to 6.5% in 1984-85, while ratemakings increased slightly to
6.5% in the same period. Even with this small decrease, rulemaking's
share remained more than twenty times larger in 1984-85 than it had
been twenty years earlier, while ratemaking's share was more than four
times larger.
The relatively low proportion of rulemakings, even in the most re-
cent period, is somewhat surprising in light of the common perception
that rulemaking has become a dominant form of agency decisionmaking
during the twenty-year period. Our data cannot directly prove or dis-
prove that perception, for they do not concern all agency proceedings,
but only those that are reviewed by courts of appeals. Thus, if a signifi-
cant number of rulemakings occurred but were for some reason not ap-
pealed to those courts, then the conventional view could still be correct.
It is possible, for example, that the more deferential standard of statutory
review often applied to rulemakings might discourage appeals. On the
other hand, one would expect that the more numerous parties, broader
applicability, and policy significance associated with rulemakings would
increase, not decrease, the probability of appeals.
The use of aggregate data conceals some important clues about
changes in agency use of rulemaking over time. Because the frequency of
rulemaking is highly skewed across different agencies, changes in the rep-
resentation of agencies in the caseload, which we discuss immediately
below, might explain much of the change in the frequency with which
different types of proceedings are used. The three largest contributors to
the appellate courts' current administrative law dockets-the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB), and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)-are
agencies that still engage almost exclusively in adjudication. Indeed, our
73. During each period, there were also a small number of non-table decisions that were coded
as "other."
74. The National Labor Relations Board, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Merit
Systems Protection Board alone accounted for two-thirds of the table decisions in the 1984-85
dataset.
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large dataset did not contain a single rulemaking proceeding by any of
these three agencies. There also were no rulemakings in the much
smaller number of Department of Labor (DOL) and patent and trade-
mark cases in the dataset. Rulemaking is more prominent, however, in
the other four agency groups-those that we called "health and environ-
ment," "other regulatory," "other departments," and "other." In those
agencies, rulemaking's share of all cases rose from less than 1% in 1965
to 12.3% in 1975, only to fall to 9.4% in 1984-85.
This is an intriguing and important finding. It shows that the appar-
ent decline in rulemaking between 1975 and 1984-85 does not reflect sim-
ply the rejection of rulemaking by the three large-volume agencies that
dominate the administrative law docket, for the decline also has occurred
in agencies that do use rulemaking to some extent. An important reason
for this trend may be that between 1975 and 1985 reviewing courts in-
creasingly constrained agency rulemaking by imposing adjudicatory-type
evidentiary and procedural burdens on agencies engaged in rulemaking.75
Another reason may be that the Reagan Administration resisted
rulemaking for political or policy reasons. 76 Whatever the cause of the
reduction in the use of rulemaking, our data indicate that this phenome-
non appears in a wide variety of agencies.
3. Review of Particular Agencie& The agency composition of the
administrative law caseload has changed significantly during the twenty-
year period we studied. (See Chart 7.) In 1965, two agencies-the
NLRB and the Patent and Trademark Office-dominated the picture,
and together accounted for over 61% of the caseload, split roughly
equally between them. In the 1984-85 period, however, the NLRB's
share dropped to just under 16% and the Patent and Trademark Office's
share declined to 6%.7 7 On the other hand, the MSPB, which did not
75. See, e.g., Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the For-
mulation of Energy Policy Through An Exceptions Proces 1984 DUKE L. 163, 194-96 (discussing
how the changes made in the process and review of rulemaking have made use of the rulemaking
process less advantageous). For an extended exploration of this theme in the context of National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration rulemaking, see Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 5.
76. Alan B. Morrison, a prominent administrative law litigator in the federal courts, asserts this
explanation. See Letter from Alan B. Morrison to Peter H. Schuck (July 16, 1990) (available from
authors). Our data indicate that the number of rulemakings reviewed by the circuit courts during
the six-month periods covered by the study increased from one in 1965, to 14 in 1975, to 24 in 1984,
and then declined to 18 in 1985. The increase between 1975 and 1984, however, is not necessarily
inconsistent with resistance to rulemaking by the Reagan Administration because the possible occa-
sions for rulemaking (statutorily mandated and otherwise) were greater during the more recent
period.
77. The Patent and Trademark Office (PAT) (in contrast to common usage, we refer to the
Patent and Trademark Office as "PAT") experienced a sharp decline between 1965 and 1985 not
only in its share of the administrative law caseload in the circuit courts, but also in the absolute
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even exist until 1978,78 now accounts for 27.5% of the caseload, while
immigration cases, which comprised only 5.4% of the caseload in 1965,
now account for 13.7% and comprise the third largest group of cases
(after the NLRB and MSPB cases).
This more recent domination of the caseload by labor, personnel,
and immigration cases also helps to explain why, as noted above, adjudi-
cation's share of the caseload has not changed significantly since 1965,
despite the greater number of rulemaking proceedings in subsequent peri-
ods: The NLRB and the MSPB employ adjudication almost exclusively.
Although the INS sometimes issues rules, its proceedings also are over-
whelmingly adjudications concerned with the exclusion, deportation, and
the adjustment of status of individuals.
One unexpected finding concerns a change that has not occurred.
Because "social regulation" seeking to protect health, safety, and envi-
ronmental (H & E) interests has generated intense controversy and bit-
terly-contested litigation since the early 1970s, we had supposed that
number of its cases being reviewed there-from 111 in the six-month period in 1965, to 56 in the
corresponding period in 1985. See supra Chart 7 and accompanying text. In contrast, the absolute
number of NLRB cases during the two periods remained the same (118).
78. Until the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act created the MSPB, appeals from Civil Service
Commission personnel actions went to the district courts. Accordingly, they were not included in
our dataset
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almost fifteen years later the circuit courts would be directly reviewing a
large number of these disputes. In the 1984-85 period, however, such
cases comprised only 3.6% of the caseload-larger than the 0.3% share
in 1965, to be sure, but still insignificant in terms of the caseload as a
whole.
4. Circuit Court Caseload& Our data concerning the administra-
tive law caseload and its distribution among the circuit courts over the
course of the two decades reveal some interesting and surprising pat-
terns. First, although the administrative law caseload of the appellate
court system as a whole grew substantially between 1965 and 1985, the
trajectory of that growth was by no means smooth. Here, we found a
conflict between our data and that compiled by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts (AO). Based on our six-month samples, the
caseload actually declined by more than 25% between 1965 and 1975. In
contrast, the AO data show an increase of 39% during this period.
Even allowing for the spasm of anti-regulation and regulatory re-
form sentiment during the Ford Administration, 79 the existence of a de-
cline (not to mention a decline of this magnitude) shown by our data was
quite unexpected. The 1975 period, after all, followed (and in some cases
coincided with) the creation of a number of new regulatory agencies and
an expansion in the regulatory programs and authorities of existing agen-
cies.80 We cannot fully account for this caseload decline between 1965
and 1975.81
A second interesting point that emerges from comparing data for
1965, 1975, and 1985 is that the D.C. Circuit's share of the total adminis-
trative law caseload remained essentially unchanged during the twenty-
79. See, ag., SuBcoMMrrruE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE HousE COMMrr-
TEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATION RE-
FORM, H.R. Doc. No. 95-134, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1976) (recommending "fundamental
adjustments in the political environment of regulation and new structures for increasing the account-
ability of agency actions to broad public interests").
80. See Lilley & Miller, The New "Social Regulation," 47 PUB. INTEREST 49, 51-52 (1977)
(between 1970 and 1975 seven major regulatory agencies were created, 30 important federal regula-
tory acts were passed, and 309 new regulations and 7305 rule amendments were published in the
Federal Register).
81. Concerned that this decline might have been caused by careless data collection for the 1965
and 1975 periods, we constructed a WESTLAW search designed to identify cases fitting our criteria
for inclusion. The search technique is explained in Appendix C. We then compared the cases so
generated against those already in our database. The fit was pretty close, but not perfect; in any
event, the number of discrepancies was not nearly large enough to have caused the caseload decline.
After the search, we again read the discrepant cases and added to our database those which the
earlier data collectors had missed.
In the end, about 90% of the 1965-75 caseload decline was caused by a decrease in the number
of patent and trademark cases coming into the appellate courts during that period.
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year period; it was 11.6% in 1965 and 12.4% in 1984-85. These data
evidently do mask some short-term fluctuations in the D.C. Circuit's
caseload share; its share almost doubled in 1975, rising to 22.7%. 82 (See
Chart 8.) Even so, however, this long-term stability is striking and puz-
zling, particularly during a period in which at least one important regula-
tory statute sought to centralize appellate jurisdiction in that circuit, 83
and in which administrative lawyers perceived a steady growth in its
prominence and power.
Third, the busiest circuit by far in the most recent period was the
Federal Circuit, whose caseload share was 36.4%, three times that of the
D.C. Circuit, and two and a half times that of its closest competitor, the
Ninth Circuit. (See Chart 9.) The Federal Circuit was established in
1981 and absorbed the jurisdictions of several existing tribunals. Two of
these-the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals84-together had accounted for 44.3% of the total cases in 1965, but
only 18.4% in 1975. In addition, the Federal Circuit hears appeals from
the MSPB, which, as noted above, now accounts for the largest number
of cases of any agency in our dataset.
5. The Composition of Reviewing Courts. The composition of re-
viewing courts in administrative law cases has changed over time. In
1965, more than 38% of the agency cases were reviewed en bane; the
Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which
together constituted nearly one-half of the administrative law caseload,
almost always sat en banc. By 1975, however, only about 6% of cases
were heard en banc; as in 1965, all but one of these hearings were in one
of the two specialized courts. By 1985, en banc cases were only 1.7% of
the caseload, and one-third of those were in the Federal Circuit. In 1965,
56.2% of the cases were decided by three-judge panels, 38.4% were de-
cided en banc, and the rest (5.4%) were decided by panels of four or
more judges, but not en banc.8 5
It is not possible to compare the 1965 data to those for 1975 and
1984-85; as to those two periods, we must exclude table decisions because
West Publishing does not indicate the court's composition in such cases
(although presumably they are almost all three-judge panels). In 1975,
three-judge panels heard 86.9% of non-table decisions; 6.1% of the cases
82. The data also reveal fluctuations of this kind in certain other circuits. For example, the
First Circuit's caseload share changes from 3.8% to 5.8% to 1.4% over the three periods.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988).
84. The Federal Circuit also hears appeals from the MSPB, certain international trade deci-
sions, and the Tax Court.
85. The share of cases decided by panels of four or more judges but less than en banc has
always been small; it was under 6% in 1965 and under 2% in 1985.
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were decided en bane, and 7.1% were decided by a panel of more than
three judges, but less than en bane. In 1984-85, three-judge panels ac-
counted for almost 97% of the non-table decisions; the number of en
bane and larger panel cases were both negligible.
The rapid growth in the use of table decisions already has been
noted, and the decline in the use of larger panels probably can be ex-
plained by efficiency considerations. But the increasing rarity of en bane
decisions in administrative law cases (only 12 out of the 688 non-table
decisions-and presumably none of the 988 table decisions-in the 1984-
85 period sample), especially outside the Federal Circuit, is striking.8 6
C. Remands and the Chevron Effect
1. The Pattern of Remands: Remands During 1984-85. We were
interested in two different aspects of remands in general, 87 each of which
generated an initial set of hypotheses. One set only concerned remands
that occurred during the most recent period (1984-85), while the other
aspect was dynamic and concerned with changes in the pattern of re-
mands since 1965.
I We began by supposing that the likelihood of each type of appellate
outcome (that is, affirmance, reversal, remands of different kinds, and
"other '" 8 ) would not vary significantly among different agencies and
among different circuits. Our thinking can be stated simply: We did not
know of any specific reasons to expect systematic variations-or of any
widely-accepted, well-specified theory of agency or appellate court be-
havior that would predict such variations. To be sure, fragmentary ob-
servations might be used to support certain predictions. For example,
one might expect the NLRB, which engages only in adjudication, to suf-
fer more reversals and remands than would health, safety, and environ-
mental agencies that do more rulemaking, which is subjected (in
principle) to a more deferential standard of review. One also might pre-
dict that the D.C. Circuit would reverse and remand more than the other
86. En bane decisions are apparently even rarer in non-administrative law cases and are declin-
ing there as well, at least as a percentage of the total caseload. See Solimine, Ideology and En Banc
Review, 67 N.C.L. REV. 29, 46 (1988) (en bane decisions as percentage of entire caseload declined
from 0.61% in 1980 to 0.48% in 1987).
87. The particular effects of Chevron on remands are considered in the next section, Infra Part
H(C)(2), '"Te Effects of Chevron."
88. Examples of dispositions that we coded as "other" include decisions dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction or for lack of a final order subject to review, decisions on an application for attorneys'
fees, decisions on a motion to add another agency as a party, decisions granting rehearing, and the
like.
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circuits.8 9 But for each of these theories, one also could propose a plausi-
ble counter-theory. None of them seems very satisfying.90
The data strongly refute our initial null hypothesis. Among differ-
ent agencies (or at least among our agency groupings), the data reveal
considerable variation in judicial review outcomes. Several general ob-
servations bear mentioning. First, a majority of the cases in all agency
groupings were affirmed in toto. If we define such a disposition as an
unambiguous agency "success," the precise success rate among some of
the agency groupings varied a great deal. During 1984-85, the most suc-
cessful agency was the MSPB (90%), whereas the least successful were
the DOL and "other regulatory agency" groupings (about 60% each).
(See Chart 10.)
Notice, however, that Chart 10 is characterized by a bimodal distri-
bution: There are two distinct groupings of agencies with different suc-
cess rates in court. One grouping clusters around an 80% affirmance
rate (INS, MSPB, PAT, Other Departments), whereas a second grouping
clusters around a much lower affirmance rate of 60% (Health & Envi-
ronment, Other Regulatory, DOL, and Other). Our data strongly sug-
gest that the disparity in success rates between the two groupings is
related to the different types of proceedings through which they make
their decisions. The group with the higher, 80% affirmance rate used
adjudication in over 99% of their cases (332 of 335), whereas the group
with the lower, 60% affirmance rate used adjudication in only 86% of
their cases (236 of 275). The disparity could be explained if it were the
case that the agencies experiencing lower success rates were agencies that
more frequently used rulemaking proceedings.
Again, our data provide some support for this interpretation.
Among the reported opinions in the 1984-85 dataset (excluding table
cases, which could not be coded as to proceeding type), the courts af-
firmed 60.4% of the adjudications in toto, but only 40.4% of the
rulemakings were affirmed in toto. Moreover, this pattern of lower
89. One theory would stress the importance of judicial ideology. Since the D.C. Circuit was
widely regarded as perhaps the most "liberal" or "activist" circuit-at least during the 1965 and
1975 periods covered by the study-one might expect that court to use judicial review as a way to
reverse the process of agency "capture" that was prominent during those periods and that occasion-
ally surfaced in opinions of that court. Another theory-call it the "familiarity breeds contempt"
idea-would stress that the volume of agency cases coming before the D.C. Circuit was so great that
the court would be less awed by claims of agency expertise than other courts without much experi-
ence with agencies.
90. To recur to the examples mentioned previously, as an "old-line" agency with a fully-elabo-
rated administrative law, the NLRB might receive greater judicial deference than relatively new
agencies, whose credentials were not as well-established. As for the D.C. Circuit, its liberal orienta-
tion might cause it to sympathize with activist, pro-regulation agencies, while its administrative law
experience might encourage respect for technical claims rather than skepticism.
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agency success rate for rulemaking, as opposed to adjudication, was
found for all time periods. When the 1965, 1975, and 1984-85 data for
reported opinions from all agencies are combined, a systematic difference
in success rates emerges: Adjudications have enjoyed a long-term suc-
cess rate of 57.8% (625 of 1082 cases), compared to only 43.9% (25 of
57) for rulemakings-in other words, the success rate for rulemaking has
been only three-quarters that for adjudications. And if we include table
cases-which we believe are disproportionately adjudications, and which
we know are about 90% affirmances in the 1984-85 period-the success
rates for adjudications would be even higher.
There are far too few rulemakings in our sample (only 2.5% in
1984-85) for the success rate disparities between adjudications and
rulemakings to account fully for the differences in success rates among
agency grouping observed in Chart 10. Rather, it is likely that the nature
of the subject matter, which tends to correlate roughly with rulemaking
as opposed to adjudication, may be the key factor in explaining the differ-
ences in agency success rates. Thus, our data suggest (though they cer-
tainly do not prove) that agencies may be less likely to be affirmed in
cases that involve broad policy questions and multiple parties-charac-
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teristics generally associated with rulemakings 9 t-as opposed to cases
that involve only individual litigants, which tend to be confined to nar-
rower issues.
There are other possible explanations for these differences in agency
success rates, explanations on which our data shed little light. It may be,
for example, that the Federal Circuit, which reviews MSPB cases, defers
more to that agency-perhaps because the personnel matters that it must
decide turn more often on issues of credibility, on which the agency usu-
ally enjoys a comparative advantage over the reviewing court. The varia-
tion in success rates among agencies, however, also may reflect other
factors such as different standards of review,92 different incentives to liti-
gate, different kinds of litigation adversaries, and so on.
2. The Effects of Chevron. The Supreme Court's Chevron deci-
sion, as clarified and reaffirmed in its Chemical Manufacturers decision
only eight months later, was widely interpreted as a landmark ruling in
administrative law.93 Most commentators agreed that in these rulings
the Court strongly signaled its intention that reviewing courts defer more
to agency interpretations of their statutory authority.94
Chevron was not without precursors. At least since 1944, there had
been a line of Supreme Court authority that reviewing courts should de-
fer to agencies' constructions of their governing statutes so long as those
constructions were "reasonable."95 There also was a contrary line of
cases, however, in which courts themselves construed statutes and gave
little or no deference to administrative interpretations. 96 The inconsis-
91. Cf ShapiroAdministrative Discretion: The Next Stage 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1500-11 (1983)
(typology of various types of discretionary decisions by agencies, including "high-volume, low-level
decisions" and broad policy decisions under "thematic statutes").
92. We did code the cases in our datasets for the standard of review. Because the courts often
failed to state explicitly what particular standard they were applying, however, we have less confi-
dence in the accuracy of these codings and we have not reported those results here.
93. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116 (1985). For an example interpreting Chemi-
cal Manufacturers as such a decision, see, e.g., Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era 3
YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986) (referring to Chevron as "watershed decision").
94. The test involves two steps. First, the reviewing court determines whether there exists spe-
cific congressional intent on the issue in question. If the court discerns such intent, either express or
implied, agency interpretations to the contrary are to be overruled. Second, if there is no such
specific congressional intent, the court assesses whether the agency's interpretation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. "Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.... [A] court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency." The test is spelled out completely in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); see also Starr, supra note 93.
95. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1964); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111 (1944).
96. See United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
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tency between these two lines of cases did not escape the notice of the
commentators. 97
The confused state of the law prior to Chevron can be summed up by
referring to SEC v. Sloan, 98 a 1978 decision in which the Supreme Court
overturned the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) interpreta-
tion of its statutory authority to suspend trading under section 12(k) of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.99 The Court reviewed numerous fac-
tors that supposedly governed the extent of deference that courts owe to
administrative constructions of statutes, such as whether the administra-
tive interpretation is "of long standing" 100 and "the thoroughness evident
in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its con-
sistency with earlier and later pronouncements." ' 10 1 The Court had to
concede that the SEC's interpretation satisfied most, if not all, of these
criteria. The Court nonetheless overturned the SEC's reading of the stat-
utory language, concluding that the agency's reading was "not the most
natural or logical one."' 10 2
In Chevron, the Supreme Court swept aside all of these criteria for
determining the extent of deference and set forth a dramatic reformula-
tion of the grounds for deferring to agency constructions of statutes. An
ambiguous statute, the Court reasoned, should be considered an implicit
legislative "delegation" 10 3 to the administrative agency of the discretion
to decide which of several permissible interpretations of the statute to
adopt. After Chevron, it no longer makes sense to speak-as the Court
itself had spoken only a few years earlier in SEC v. Sloan--of a statute
administered by an agency as having a single "most natural or logical"
meaning. If that were the issue, courts presumably would be at least as
adept as agencies at discerning Congress' meaning. But in Chevron, the
Supreme Court no longer conceptualized statutory construction as the
method of finding a single, correct meaning on every point. Rather, an
ambiguous statute is now conceived as creating a policy space within
97. See, eg., Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub
nor. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977). In Pittston, Judge Friendly
wrote that "there are two lines of Supreme Court decisions on this subject which are analytically in
conflict, with the result that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more appropriate for
the case at hand." Id at 49. See also 5 K. DAVIS, ADMIirNRATVE LAW TREATISE § 29.07
(1984); Geflhorn & Robinson, Perspectives hn Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780-81
(1975).
98. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78(k) (1988).
100. Sloan, 436 U.S. at 118.
101. Id (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
102. Id at 112.
103. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
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which the agency is free to move, provided that its actions are reasonable
and do not exceed the ambit of congressionally-delegated authority104
According to Chevron, the issue of whether a court should defer to
an agency construction of a statute reduces to two questions:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on apermissible construction of the statute.' 05
As the italicized passages suggest, however, Chevron's two questions are
themselves ambiguous. How clearly must Congress have spoken before
its "intent" is binding on an agency? And how is a reviewing court to
determine whether the agency's construction of the statute is "permissi-
ble" except by construing the statute for itself in the traditional way?
In the months immediately following Chevron, several courts of ap-
peals attempted to cut Chevron down to size by reading the opinion as
having left substantial leeway for courts to find "implied intent" by Con-
gress based on statutory language, overall statutory purpose or the legis-
lative history.106  In Chemical Manufacturers0 7 (decided only eight
months after Chevron), and several other decisions thereafter, 08 the
Court reaffirmed its Chevron analysis. The Chemical Manufacturers de-
cision was particularly significant; there, the court of appeals had relied
on explicit statutory language and legislative history in overturning the
agency's construction of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, citing
Chevron and holding that the issue was for the agency because "the
104. For an excellent summary of Chevron and the lines of authority that preceded it, see Starr,
supra note 93.
105. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
106. See, eg., Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 144-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(although the court found no explicit congressional intent on question of interpretation of Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), it implied intent from the "preponderance of evidence"
gleaned from the legislative history).
107. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
108. See, eg., Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986) (affirming
Chevron but finding Federal Reserve Board's regulation defining "banks" as outside statutory au-
thority); United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657 (1986) (Secretary of Energy not prohibited by
Flood Control Act from establishing interim hydroelectric power rates); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (holding Corps of Engineers' extension of regulatory
authority as reasonable under statutory authority).
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wording and legislative history of the statute... [do] not evince an un-
ambiguous congressional intention to forbid" the course chosen by the
agency. 1 9
If the Court meant what it said in Chevron and its progeny, and if
reviewing courts took its words seriously, one would expect the distribu-
tion of outcomes in agency cases to change to reflect the effects of Chev-
ron. In particular, one would expect the courts to affirm more frequently
and to remand less frequently. As Solicitor General Kenneth Starr (then
a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit) ob-
served, in Chevron "the Supreme Court invalidated what had been a
rather common method of overturning agency interpretations" of stat-
utes.110 A central goal of our study was to determine whether legal trem-
ors of this magnitude, significant but subtle changes in legal doctrines,
actually affect the subsequent behavior of the lower courts in reviewing
administrative decisions. For a number of reasons, we did not share the
expectation that outcomes would change after Chevron. By explaining
our reasons, -we hope to underscore the significance of what we did find.
To begin with, we have been educated and have come to profes-
sional maturity in the shadow of the Legal Realist tradition. This tradi-
tion, which we share with most contemporary lawyers, emphasizes that
legal rules often are indeterminate and malleable, and that these charac-
teristics of law enable courts to exercise discretion in shaping their deci-
sions. Courts, in the Realist view, choose according to a variety of
considerations that are wholly extrinsic to the rules themselves, including
the judges' policy preferences, their conceptions of institutional roles,
their theories of justice, craft norms, and the like.II
In general, we share this view and we believed that it was especially
accurate as an account of how most courts review agency cases. Courts,
after all, possess both the motivation and the institutional and doctrinal
freedom to ride herd on agencies. Powerful structural and constitutional
concerns drive courts in that direction: Agencies are armed with the co-
ercive, redistributive power of the nation; they act under open-ended
delegations of authority from Congress; and their appointed officials
combine governmental functions that our constitutional scheme has
sought to diffuse. If courts are suspicious of agency power, their mistrust
only mirrors that of members of Congress and the general public.
109. Chemical Mfra, 470 U.S. at 129.
110. Starr, supra note 93, at 295.
111. See, eg., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 100-17 (1949) (Judges are influenced
by a multitude of factors, many of them unconscious. Because "legal rules" play only a small part in
the judicial decisionmaking process, law can never be entirely predictable.).
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The circumstances under which circuit courts operate also strongly
tempt them to intervene to review agency decisions. The standards and
scope of judicial review often are broad and unconstraining. The records
in administrative cases often are so extensive that reviewing courts can
extract from them plausible grounds for either an affirmance or a re-
mand. Congress often legislates against a background practice of close
judicial review, and reaffirms and relies upon that practice. In addition,
the probability that the Supreme Court will review, much less reverse,
any particular decision by a circuit court is very low.
Thus, appellate courts' close scrutiny of agency decisions has been
legitimated by basic constitutional values, fueled by deep institutional
suspicions, and fortified by legal and strategic considerations. This prac-
tice is now deeply embedded in our system. Indeed, it is so firmly estab-
lished that even Congress would find it exceedingly difficult to change the
essential character of judicial review in agency cases.' 12 In terms of the
present inquiry, this observation raises two questions: How effective in
general is the Supreme Court likely to be in actually inducing the circuit
courts to be more deferential to agency decisions? And given the fact
that the Court plainly attempted to do just that in Chevron, has it suc-
ceeded in this task?
The evidence concerning the effectiveness of Supreme Court deci-
sions in altering the behavior of the lower courts is mixed: Results seem
to turn upon many factors, including how clearly the Court defined its
normative requirement, how workable that requirement seems to be in
practice, how costly it is for litigants to identify deviations from that
norm, and whether the norm can be implemented only with the coopera-
tion of extra-judicial actors, such as a bureaucracy. 13 These factors sug-
gest that the Court's success in shaping lower court behavior will vary
according to the area of law and the policy domain in question.
However the question of the effectiveness of Supreme Court supervi-
sion may be answered generally, we are not entirely at sea when we seek
to answer it in the particular context relevant to this study-administra-
tive law. Two case studies of recent efforts by the Court to require re-
viewing courts to accord greater deference to agency decisions provide
strong grounds for doubting the effectiveness of those efforts." 14
112. Eg., Lindall v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768 (1985). Congress' hostility
to limits on judicial review is suggested by the Veterans' Judicial Review Act-Veterans' Benefits
Improvement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4120 (1988) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 4092
(1988)).
113. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 1, at chs. 1, 6 & 7.
114. See T. ALEInKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 516-27 (1985)
(faced with what they deem to be compelling humanitarian concerns, lower courts have resisted
Supreme Court's desire in INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), to be less intrusive in suspension of
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These examples (and others) of how reviewing courts can thwart the
Supreme Court's demands for greater deference to agencies made us
skeptical that Chevron and Chemical Manufacturers would enjoy much
success. Indeed, certain aspects of these decisions reinforced our doubts.
To begin with, the Court proposed to treat deference as a categorical
rule, equally applicable in the great variety of situations in which it may
arise. Further, it seemed likely to frustrate, rather than advance, Con-
gress' purposes concerning court-agency relationships, which sometimes
favor less deference rather than more. It would also produce some un-
necessary procedural delays and complexities in a system that is already
overburdened. Finally, it called for a degree of judicial forbearance in
the face of perceived agency error that many courts would find difficult
to sustain.1 15
An additional reason for doubting the efficacy of the Court's in-
struction in Chevron grew out of the opinion itself. Despite the Court's
determination to exact from reviewing courts greater deference to agency
policymaking, the Court's language failed to instruct the circuits with the
unmistakable clarity and moral authority that seem minimally necessary
(although not always sufficient) for the Court to succeed in altering the
shape of court-agency relationships. Instead, the language of the opinion
contained some important ambiguities and raised new and difficult ques-
tions. 116 These uncertainties enabled the circuit courts to adopt the strat-
egy that they had pursued successfully in the wake of Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC 1 1 7 and INS v. Wang. 11 They could af-
firm Chevron's authoritativeness generally while retaining plenty of ma-
neuvering room in specific cases, should they conclude that the agency's
deportation cases); Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 Sup. Cr. REv. 345 (D.C. Circuit remarkably ineffective in implementing principles of interpre-
tation in wake of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978)). In
both Vermont Yankee and Wang, the Supreme Court spoke to the reviewing courts with unusual
vehemence and clarity.
115. See eg., Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363,
373-82 (1986) (discussing problems caused by ambiguous language in Chevron); Sunstein, Deregula-
tion and the Court, 5 J. PoL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 517, 528-30 (1986) (outlining problems in
following Chevron's "clear statement" approach).
116. Several commentators have explored these questions raised by the Court's language. See,
eg., Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 1 (1990) (Congressional intent in delegating authority to agencies should determine whether
reviewing court must accept agency interpretation); Breyer, supra note 115 (arguing that the strict
verbal interpretation of Chevron, embraced by some lower courts, will give way to a more complex
approach that better reflects judicial reality); Sunstein, supra note 115 (arguing that the "clear state-
ment" approach is flawed because it is unlikely to serve Congress' own goals and expectations; it
unnecessarily restricts judicial discretion; and it fails to provide a constitutional check on agency
power).
117. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
118. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
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position was unjustified. 119 Thus, although we never imagined that the
circuit courts would openly defy Chevron, we did expect that they would
find it easy and often desirable to circumvent it. They began with power-
ful reasons, grounded in well-established constitutional values and insti-
tutional role conceptions, to resist a demand that they accord agency
decisions more deference than those decisions warranted. To these mo-
tives for resistance, the opinion's language added many opportunities for
principled evasion. This combination of features, we predicted, would
probably neutralize any significant behavioral effect of Chevron.
This expectation resonates with a larger controversy within the
academy, one that extends well beyond administrative law to the very
nature of all law. In recent years, scholars associated with the Critical
Legal Studies movement have emphasized that legal doctrine is "indeter-
minate" in the sense that it does not constrain judges in their resolution
of disputes. These "law skeptics" argue that because legal rules are "suf-
ficiently ambiguous or internally contradictory to justify any result we
can imagine," judges can use it to rationalize decisions reached on other,
usually undisclosed grounds.' 20
This claim, law skeptics acknowledge, is at bottom an empirical
one, 121 and it has implications that can be tested. At least in its strong
form, the claim implies that doctrinal changes such as Chevron should
not affect the pattern of results reached in subsequent cases by lower
courts, provided that the judges' personal and political predilections re-
main essentially unchanged during the period under study.' 22 Because
we drew our cases from two time periods that bracket Chevron and are
separated from each other by less than one year, our dataset would seem
to satisfy that proviso and permit us to test that implication of the law
skeptics' claim.
a. The outcomes effect. We began by testing for what we call the
"outcomes effect"-Chevron's effect upon the distribution of appellate
court outcomes. To do so, we analyzed the proportions of the total
number of administrative cases that were affirmed, reversed, remanded,
119. See eg., Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985) (court held Board of
Immigration Appeals applied an incorrect legal standard by applying a "clear probability" standard
instead of a "well-founded fear" standard in aliens' claims for asylum), aff'd 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
120. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.. 1, 19-20
(1984); see also Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principle-; 96 HARV. L. Ry.v. 781, 819 (1983).
121. Singer, supra note 120, at 10.
122. Our own version of the law skepticism claim is generally weaker, although as applied to
administrative law it led us to essentially the same prediction about the effect of Chevron. See supra
text accompanying notes 111-19.
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or had some other disposition both before and after Chevron. The results
of this analysis are presented in Tables 3 and 4 below:
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES-CHI SQUARE TEST
1984
Observed Percent Expected (O-E)2/E
Affirmed 523 70.9% 561.38 2.62
Reversed 106 14.4% 79.89 8.54
Remanded 106 14.4% 84.25 5.61
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Table 3 shows a pronounced change in the appellate court
dispositions of agency cases after Chevron. Remands, which constituted
14.4% of total dispositions in the 1984 dataset, dropped to 9.3% in 1985.
This change, which is shown graphically in Chart 11, amounts to more
than a 40% decrease in the frequency of remands (after normalizing for
caseload growth between 1984 and 1985). (See Table 4.)
TABLE 4: CHANGE IN DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES
1984/1985
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This striking finding led us to ask two additional questions. First,
we wanted to know about what we call the "outcome displacement
effect." Since there was a pronounced decrease in the proportion of cases
remanded after Chevron, where did the "missing remands" go? Did they
become affirmances, reversals, or something else? Second, we wanted to
know about what we call the "reasons displacement effect." Of those
remands that remained, what was the distribution of the different reasons
for the remands-law, fact, or rationale-and how did that distribution
of reasons compare to the pre-Chevron distribution?
b. The outcome displacement effect. Returning to Table 3 above,
it can be seen that not only did remands decrease, but reversals also de-
creased by a comparable amount, and afirmances increased. Between
1984 and 1985, affrmances in toto increased from 70.9% of the cases to
81.3%. As shown in Table 4, more of the increase in the number of
affirmances was attributable to a reduction in the number of reversals
(down 29 cases), than to a reduction in the number of remands (19 fewer
cases). This distribution is fully consistent with the logic of Chevron:
Although a court rarely, if ever, reverses on a ground other than an error
of law, remands can be justified more easily on alternative grounds.
The differences in the distribution of outcomes in the 1984 and 1985
datasets are shown graphically in Chart 11. A chi square (X2 ) test for
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statistical significance is included in Table 3 above. It shows that the
differences in the distributions of results between the 1984 and 1985
datasets are statistically significant at well above the 99% confidence
level.
As a further way to assess our results, we graphed the data on a
month-by-month basis. (See Chart 12.) This shows remarkable consis-
tency in the percentages of cases affirmed (rather than reversed or re-
manded) throughout both periods. In none of the six months during
1984 that we studied did the percentage of affirmances approach even the
level for the month with the lowest number of affirmances during 1985.
This strongly suggests a systematic difference between the 1984 and 1985
datasets. Chart 12 also appears to exclude seasonal variation in the re-
porting of cases as a possible confounding factor.
c- The reasons displacement effect We have seen that our data
on the outcomes effect tend to refute one major implication of the strong
version of the law skeptics' claim, as Chevron significantly altered the
proportion of agency cases affirmed by the appellate courts over a period
of time during which judicial membership and preferences apparently
were stable. Our data also enabled us to test another implication of that
claim. On its face, the Chevron decision appeared to make it more diffi-
cult for a reviewing court to reverse or remand an administrative deci-
sion for an error of law in construing a statute.123 If the skeptics were
correct, post-Chevron courts might try to maximize their residual power
to remand by avoiding reliance upon substantive law-based remands (and
reversals)-the only type that Chevron had discouraged-and by relying
instead upon remands on procedural, fact-based, rationale-based, or un-
stated grounds, situations to which Chevron did not expressly apply. We
call this the "reasons displacement" effect.
To learn whether the Chevron decision caused judges to alter the
grounds on which they rationalized their decisions to remand, we coded
all the reported cases that remanded administrative decisions during a
six-month period in 1984 prior to Chevron, and during a six-month pe-
riod in 1985 after Chevron, into five categories:12 4 (1) remands for errors
of substantive law; (2) remands for errors of procedural law; (3) remands
123. The so-called Chenery doctrine in administrative law holds that courts should normally
remand for reconsideration by the agency those decisions that are based on errors of law rather than
reverse the agency outright. The remand permits the agency to consider whether as a discretionary
matter the agency wishes to alter its result or supply an alternative rationale for it. See generally
Friendly, supra note 33 (exploring the scope that courts have attributed to Chenery); Weaver, Che-
nery II: A Forty Year Retrospective, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 161 (1988) (examining the current status of
Chenery II).
124. An individual case, of course, might be assigned to more than one category.
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for lack of adequate factual support; (4) remands for lack of adequate
explanation; and (5) remands for which no basis is given for the court's
action (e.g., table decisions). As shown in Table 5, which follows, move-
ment from reliance upon substantive law in favor of the other grounds
for remand did occur after Chevron.
TABLE 5: REASONS FOR REMAND
1984 1985 84/85
# % # % % Change(*)
Law-Substance 38 35.8% 19 21.8% -39.1%
Law-Procedure 16 15.1% 15 17.2% 14.2%
Fact-Based 30 28.3% 28 32.2% 13.7%
Rationale 19 17.9% 18 20.7% 15.4%
Unstated 19 17.9% 20 23.0% 28.3%
Total 122 115.1% 100 114.9%
No. Cases 106 87
* Normalized
As can be seen from the percentage change ("% Change") column
in Table 5, there is a pronounced (39%) decrease in the proportion of
remands that rely on errors of substantive law as a reason for remand.
Although the other grounds for remand, including the absence of a
stated reason, increased their percentage shares of the total, the actual
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numbers of cases in these categories remained remarkably constant.
Thus, there was virtually no change in the total number of remands for
procedural errors between 1984 and 1985, but due to the smaller total
number of remands in 1985, the percentage of cases remanded for other
reasons actually increased. The distribution of reasons for remands and
the percentage changes in that distribution between the 1984 and 1985
datasets are shown graphically in Chart 13.
SLaw-Sub.ll I M ill
[ Law-Proc.
I Fact
[ R a tio n a le . . .. . -- 2 0 %
SUnstated
1984 1985 %Change
Percentage of Remanded Cases
To determine whether these changes in the reasons for remands are
statistically significant, a chi square (X) test was performed. As shown
in Table 6, the comparison is not statistically significant with respect to
the variation in the distribution of reasons for remands as a whole.
However, when the contingency table was restructured to compare
remands based on substantive law versus all other reasons, this
comparison was found to be statistically significant at above the 95%
confidence level. (See Table 7.) The effect on substantive remands is
shown graphically in Chart 14 and these results strongly suggest that
Chevron discouraged remands based on substantive law. The post-
Chevron "slice" representing remands for substantive reasons is much
smaller than the pre-Chevron slice for two reasons-fewer remands
overall and a smaller proportion of remands being made on the grounds
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TABLE 6: REASONS FOR REMAND--CH SQUARE TEST
1984
Observed Percent Expected (O-E)2/E
Law-Substance 38 35.8% 31.32 1.42
Law-Procedure 16 15.1% 17.04 0.06
Fact-based 30 28.3% 31.87 0.11
Rationale 19 17.9% 20.33 0.09





















TABLE 7: REASONS FOR REMAND-Cm SQUARE TEST
1984
Observed Percent Expected (O-E-.5)2/E
Law-Substance 38 31.1% 31.32 1.22
Other 68 55.7% 74.74 0.70
Total 106
1985















Overall, our analysis tends to contradict the law skeptics' prediction.
Our data indicate that subsequent decisions were being shaped by
Chevron's strong "outcomes" and "outcome displacement" effects. Our
aggregate data are at their most ambiguous with respect to the existence
of a "reasons displacement" effect. The total number of remands based
on grounds other than substantive law was constant, but this total
increased as a percentage of all remands. We cannot rule out the
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Chart 14
Decrease in Substantive Remands
Law-Subst. \N Law-Subst.
All Other All Other
1984 1985
Percentage of Remanded Cases
by exploiting the leverage that remained available to them 125-their
residual power to select the particular reasons for the remand. Indeed,
our separate analysis of the effects of Chevron on the D.C. Circuit1 26
strongly suggests that some courts may have tried to circumvent that
doctrinal change. These effects, however, do not show up as clear
evidence of a "reasons displacement" effect in the aggregate data. All
that fairly may be said based on the aggregate data is that there was a
dramatic decrease in substantive law remands following Chevron, and
that the number of remands in other categories remained constant. This
is strong evidence that Chevron changed the overall distribution of
outcomes, but it does not exclude the possibility that the intended effect
of a new rule can be avoided or blunted in some individual cases.
3. Persistence of Effects. The striking disparities in the rates of
remands and reversals between the 1984 and 1985 datasets and the shift
in grounds for remands in the wake of Chevron led us to wonder whether
the effects that we had observed would be temporary or persistent. We
thought that good arguments could be made for either prediction.
125. See eg., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 186 (1951) (concerning the "leeways"
available to judges who want to avoid constraints of precedents or the tendency of appellate courts to
shift the content and direction of authorities when applying them to new circumstances).
126. See infra Part III(C)(4).
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The simplest, most straightforward hypothesis based on our com-
parison of the 1984 and 1985 data was that the post-Chevron changes
would endure. If the lower courts were willing to follow Chevron (as our
analysis of the 1985 data indicated they clearly were), one of their most
powerful weapons for overruling agencies-their ability to impose a
judicial interpretation of the statute-had been disarmed. In addition,
Chevron seemed to comport with the long-term trends in American ad-
ministrative law toward increasing deference to agency lawmaking. 127
On the other hand, we also could easily imagine several reasons why
the post-Chevron changes might not endure. The passage of time itself
might erode the effects v~e had observed shortly after Chevron. Perhaps
lower courts are relatively sensitive to doctrinal changes in the immediate
wake of a Supreme Court decision, but the impact of the change may be
attenuated over time as new cases and other issues gain prominence, and
as lower courts learn to write remand opinions that satisfy Chevron's re-
quirements. If this hypothesis were true, then one would expect that re-
mand and reversal rates gradually would drift back toward their long-
term historical averages. A variation of this "regression toward the
mean" hypothesis turns on what political scientist Carl Friedrich called
the "rule of anticipated reactions." 128
A third, alternative hypothesis would predict some decrease in
agency success rates between 1985 and 1988, not because of anticipated
reactions, but because the law itself changed after Chevron. Between
1985 and 1988, the Supreme Court appeared to recede from the position
of extreme deference to agency constructions that it had seemed to en-
dorse in Chevron and its immediate progeny. 129 The most prominent of
these decisions was INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 130 decided in 1987. Over
Justice Antonin Scalia's strong objection in his concurrence that the ma-
jority's approach was "not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chev-
ron,"131 the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca reasserted judicial supremacy as
127. See e g., Mashaw, Pro-Delegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) (proposing that broader delegation of power to agencies actually im-
proves governmental responsiveness).
128. C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITFrIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: NATURE AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 588-89 & n.117 (1941).
129. See generally Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Dis-
cretion, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 646, 688-703 (1988) (discussingpost-Chevron caselaw as failing to effect
a revolution in "the relationship between courts and agencies").
130. 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see also NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
23, 484 U.S. 112, 125 (1987) (Courts' task "under Cardoza-Fonseca and Chevron, is not judicially to
categorize each agency determination, but rather to decide whether the agency's regulatory place-
ment is permissible.").
131. Cardoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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"the final authority on issues of statutory construction,"' 132 at least where
"traditional tools of statutory construction" may be employed to deter-
mine the statute's meaning. 133
In order to determine whether the observed changes in reversal and
remand rates in the wake of Chevron were indeed transitory, we ex-
panded our study to include a two-month period in the then-most recent
advance sheets (covering cases decided during March and April, 1988).
Although this dataset of 1988 cases was only about one-quarter the size
of the dataset of 1985 cases, we hoped that comparing the two would
allow us to assess the durability of Chevron's effects on appellate court
behavior.
Table 8, which follows, analyzes the pattern of results during the
two month period in 1988 as compared to the 1985 sample period. The
1988 data show an affirmance rate of 75.5%; this is roughly halfway be-
tween the pre-Chevron affirmance rate of 70.9% and the post-Chevron
affirmance rate of 81.3%. (See Chart 15.) Because the differences in out-
comes between the 1988 and 1985 datasets are statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level, we can say with a high degree of certainty that
they are not merely the result of random statistical variation.
We cannot say with a similar level of confidence, however, why the
1988 outcomes are different from those in 1985. It is very tempting to
conclude that the refinement of the legal doctrine in post-Chevron cases
such as Cardoza-Fonseca produced a corresponding adjustment in
agency success rates. 134 This suggests the tantalizing hypothesis that
over a large number of cases the results of judicial review may be far
more sensitive to subtle changes in legal doctrine than we had antici-
pated. Unfortunately, our analysis does not permit us to test this hy-
pothesis, for we cannot exclude the possibility that the passage of time,
other changes in legal doctrine, the changing composition of the judici-
ary, or some other confounding factor may account for the observed
changes in agency success rates between Chevron and early 1988. We
132. Id. at 447 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
133. Id.
134. Recent Supreme Court cases consider the Chevron standard of review to be well-established
precedent. However, the unanimous agreement on the Chevron standard has not prevented disagree-
ment on how the standard should be applied in particular cases. Se eg., Sullivan v. Everhart, 110
S. Ct. 960 (1990) (Supreme Court reversed decision by court of appeals after finding that the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services' regulations were based on a reasonable construction of the
Social Security Act); Dole v. United Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990) (Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Third Circuit after finding that the clear congressional intent of the Paperwork
Reduction Act was to prevent the OMB from reviewing agency disclosure rules). Judicial diver-
gence in applying the Chevron standard has led one D.C. Circuit judge to comment recently that
courts often invoke Chevron merely to give "lip service to deference." Silberman, Chevron-The
Intersection of Law and Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 826 (1990).
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TABLE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES--Cm SQUARE TEST
1988
Observed Percent Expected (O-E)2/E
Affirmed 111 75.5% 116.58 0.27
Reversed 12 8.2% 11.87 0.00
Remanded 25 17.0% 14.94 6.77
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can say with some certainty, however, that the 1988 agency success rate
was lower than the 1985 agency success rate and that this difference was
not merely a random statistical variation.
The most striking difference that emerges from the 1988 and 1985
datasets is a pronounced increase in the percentage of cases remanded.
As shown in Table 8 above, remands in 1985 accounted for only 9.3% of
cases; by 1988 the percentage of cases remanded had almost doubled to
17.0%. When normalized to adjust for difference in the size of the
datasets, the frequency of remands increased by 83.4% from 1985 to
1988, as shown in Table 9, which follows.






We had expected that Chevron would induce courts to increase the
frequency of remands, rather than outright reversals. By 1988, courts
were indeed remanding more frequently than they had done in 1985,
immediately after Chevron. Most of the increased remands, however,
were not displacing reversals (which remained unchanged); they were
displacing "other" dispositions. Unfortunately, the data for 1988 are too
limited to allow us to say anything definitive about changes in the
grounds for remands. But courts' increasing propensity to remand
suggests that within a few years of Chevron, the increase in remands that
we had predicted took place after all; it simply occurred somewhat later
than we had anticipated. We also expected a "reasons displacement"
effect, whereby courts would shift from substantive law-based reversals
and remands, to remands on other grounds, 135 but the number of
remands in our 1988 dataset was too small to derive significant
conclusions on this issue.
When we factor into our analysis the longer-term perspective
provided by the 1988 data, the following picture emerges: Within a few
months after Chevron, the affirmance rate rose substantially, while
reversals and remands decreased almost equally to account for the
increased affirmance rate. Over the longer term, however, remands
gradually returned to, and then exceeded, their pre-Chevron levels,
eroding about half of the increase in affirmances that Chevron had
135. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26 (discussion of the "reasons displacement" effect).
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produced. Outright reversals remained infrequent. These changes are
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4. Court-Specific Effects. So far, we have discussed the issue of
the "effects of Chevron" as if the federal courts were a monolith. The
organization of our datasets, however, permits us to make comparisons
to assess whether particular courts or categories of cases are consistent
with or run counter to the national trends. A particularly interesting
example of how aggregate data may be misleading involves the D.C. Cir-
cuit's behavior in the wake of the Chevron decision. Chart 17 compares
historical rates of affirmance in administrative law cases in the D.C. Cir-
cuit with the comparable rates in the circuit courts as a whole (including
the D.C. Circuit). Chart 17 shows that the affirmance rates in the D.C.
Circuit were similar to the aggregate affirmance rate for all circuit courts
in 1965 and 1975. By the mid-1980s, however, a striking disparity had
developed. On the eve of the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron,
the D.C. Circuit was affirming only 58.6% of administrative law cases,
compared to a national circuit court average of 70.9%. This difference
may in part reflect the fact that the D.C. Circuit handles more of the
complex, multiple-issue rulemakings, which are affirmed less often. 136
136. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92 and Chart 10.
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But the disparity also suggests that the extra "hard look" in administra-
tive law cases that is sometimes attributed to the D.C. Circuit was indeed
occurring in the mid-1980s just before Chevron was decided.
Chart 17
Percent Affirmed
D.C. Cir. vs. All Fed.
We are tempted to speculate that the relatively low affirmance rate
for administrative law cases in the D.C. Circuit may have been one mo-
tive for the Supreme Court's clear message in Chevron that lower courts
should defer more to agency constructions of statutes. When we com-
pare the D.C. Circuit's affirmance rate with the national circuit court
average in 1985, just after Chevron, we find that the Supreme Court's
message did not immediately induce greater deference by the D.C. Cir-
cuit. Between 1984 and 1985, while the national average affirmance rate
rose from 70.9% to 81.3%, the affirmance rate in the D.C. Circuit actu-
ally declined from 58.6% to 52.6%. Further analysis using our research
methodology could shed light on the particular techniques that the D.C.
Circuit used to buck the national post-Chevron trend of increasing defer-
ence, although our dataset may be too small to permit drawing statisti-
cally significant conclusions on this issue. In any event, by 1988 the gap
between the D.C. Circuit and the other circuit courts had narrowed
(61.5% versus 75.5%). Still, affirmance rates remained almost 15%
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5. Agency-Specific Effects The data on agency-specific success
rates yield another significant finding: For most agency groups, the data
suggest a pronounced outcome displacement effect in the wake of Chev-
ron. For example, the proportion of the cases in the residual category
that were affirmed in toto increased from 52% to 78% between the pre-
and post-Chevron periods. The affirmance rate for the health, safety, and
environmental agency grouping; the NLRB; and the Patent and Trade-
mark Office also increased substantially between those periods. But this
pattern was not evident for all agency groupings. For two of them (im-
migration and "other regulatory"), the success rate actually declined (al-
beit only slightly) after Chevron. The "Chevron effect," it appears, is an
even more complex phenomenon than we have suggested.
If we look instead at the agency "failure rate," defined as the pro-
portion of cases in which the reviewing court simply reversed, thus de-
priving the agency of any further opportunity to succeed, 137 similar
patterns are revealed. The failure rate varied considerably from grouping
to grouping; it ranged from 13.5% in the residual category to 2.3% for
agencies in departments other than Labor. If anything, the Chevron ef-
fect was even stronger when this measure was used; the failure rates of
several groupings' declined substantially (for health, safety, and environ-
mental agencies, from 28% to 6%; and for the NLRB, from 19% to
5%).138
D. What Happens After Remand?
Judicial opinions are stories-albeit elaborate, highly stylized
ones-and only the most unimaginative reader of opinions could finish
them without wondering how the stories actually end. 139 Courts in ad-
ministrative law cases are especially likely to pique our curiosity when,
forswearing their power to resolve the dispute themselves, they instead
remand it to the agency to write the story's conclusion. In such cases we
naturally want to know about the denouement. Specifically, we ask:
What did the agency do procedurally once it got the case back? What
was the outcome, and did the court's intervention really matter? How
long did the proceedings take after remand? And were there intervening
137. As we pointed out, see supra note 44, some double counting was inevitable under our cod-
ing system because a case that was reversed in part and either affirmed in part or remanded in part
was coded as both a reversal and as something else.
138. Again, two groupings seemed to controvert the Chevron effect, although both changes were
very small. The failure rates of immigration cases increased from 4% to 5%, and the MSPB's rate
increased from 2.9% to 3.1%.
139. See, ag., J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976); A. LEwis, GIDEON'S
TRUMPET (1964); P. SciiucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRiAL: MASS TOXIC DISAsTERs IN THE
COURTS 255-57 (1986).
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events that affected the outcome? Taken together, these questions pose
what is probably the least studied but most important issue surrounding
administrative law: What difference does judicial review of agency action
make?
Unfortunately, our study cannot resolve this issue definitively. Our
data on post-remand events, which relate to the 1984-85 period, consist
entirely of the responses of the parties' lawyers to a questionnaire and
follow-up telephone interviews. These data are, therefore, inevitably im-
pressionistic. In addition, the lawyers may have tended to put a some-
what better (from their clients' perspective) face on the outcomes than
more detached observers would.14° Nevertheless, the data do permit us
to shed some light on some of the empirical questions noted above.
1. Post-Remand Procedures, We began with some general hy-
potheses concerning what happens procedurally once a case is returned
to an agency. First, we expected that many remands would lead to infor-
mal settlements or withdrawals. The delay incident to any remand, to-
gether with the further agency proceedings that a remand might
necessitate, could be so costly that the parties would seek a cost-mininiz-
ing alternative to continued litigation. More generally, remand decisions
would almost certainly alter the parties' prospects, bargaining positions,
and incentives to litigate.141 Second, the reasons displacement effect that
we found should support the hypothesis that agencies to which cases
were remanded in the post-Chevron period would hold additional hear-
140. This bias could not be entirely overcome (and may even have been compounded in some
cases) by our technique of asking the lawyers on both sides--"agency" and "petitioner"-the identi-
cal questions about each of the remanded cases. (Our convention was to label the party opposing the
agency as "petitioner" even when it was the agency that had petitioned for review of the decision
below.)
This technique, however, did reveal persistent discrepancies between the responses of the
agency's lawyers and those of the petitioner's lawyers. The discrepancies occurred not only as to
questions to which we expected the parties to respond differently (e.g., "Which of the following...
best describes the practical effect on your client?"), but also as to those to which we expected their
responses to be identical (e.g., procedures after remand; elapsed time). Because these discrepancies
generally were quite small (on the order of 5% or less), we ascribe no particular significance to them,
but they do present a problem in reporting and analyzing the data. We have chosen to average the
petitioner's and agency lawyers' responses on the theory (lacking any better one) that the truth lies
somewhere in between. Where particular discrepancies might be of substantive signifcance, we note
them.
Finally, the crudeness of these data have caused us often to use terms like "roughly" or "about"
rather than numerical percentages, which should alert readers to the analysis's imprecision on these
points.
141. For example, a remand that resolved points of substantive or procedural law or that sig-
naled the court's view of the merits would reduce the parties' uncertainty as to the ultimate outcome,
while a remand that demanded more agency fact-finding or justification would increase the cost to
the agency of continuing to maintain its earlier position.
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ings more frequently or otherwise supplement the record. The agencies,
we supposed, would need to institute such procedures in order to cure
the factual or explanatory defects identified by the reviewing courts.
The data confirmed our first hypothesis. The lawyers reported that
in about 40% of the remanded cases in 1985, no further proceedings oc-
curred.142 The number of remands that "wash out" in this way increased
by about 10% after Chevron. Among the agency clusters, the NLRB,
DOL, and "other regulatory" group were the ones least likely to under-
take further post-remand proceedings. This tends to confirm our suspi-
cion that adjudications, which accounted for virtually all of the NLRB
and DOL cases, are easier to settle or drop than other kinds of
proceedings.
Our second hypothesis-that remands after Chevron would more
frequently cause the agencies to hold additional hearings or revise the
record-was not borne out. Indeed, the opposite was true. Although
proceedings of that kind were instituted in roughly 30% of the remanded
cases during the pre-Chevron period, that figure declined to about 18%
in the post-Chevron period. This mystery only deepened when we disag-
gregated the remands in order to focus upon the fact-based and/or ra-
tionale-based cases, which were more common after Chevron and were
expected to necessitate record-revising procedures after remand. Con-
trary to expectations, we found that such procedures were more likely to
be employed before Chevron than after. Although the post-Chevron in-
crease in cases that "wash out" probably accounts for some of this de-
cline, we are unable to explain the rest of it.
More generally, the data on post-remand procedures reveal certain
features of the structure of post-remand activity. At a gross level, we can
see what happens procedurally. As already mentioned, pre-Chevron
about 40% of the remanded cases prompted no further action while only
30% of the remands (18% post-Chevron) actually led to procedures in
which the administrative record would be revised. The data also indicate
that in another 15-20% of the remands, the agency instead issued a new
opinion-which usually sought to justify its earlier position by adopting
a new legal theory or interpretation-rather than simply supplying addi-
tional explanation. The remainder of the cases were coded "other."
142. Our data on post-remand outcomes, discussed in the next subsection, see infra Part
IlI(D)(2), "Post-Remand Outcomes," distinguish between agencies that "agreed to settlement" and
agencies that "dropped the proceeding." Unfortunately, the total for these two categories does not
equal the total for "no further proceedings after remand." We are uncertain about the sources of
this discrepancy. One may be that cases in which the non-agency party dropped the proceeding were
coded as "other." Another may be that "no further proceedings after remand" was applied so liter-
ally as to exclude cases that the agency dropped only after some proceedings had occurred.
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When we disaggregate the post-remand activity data by circuit
court, the most interesting finding is that remands in the D.C. Circuit
were less likely to "wash out" than those in all other circuits com-
bined. 143 It is not at all clear why this should occur unless the greater
significance of D.C. Circuit cases makes them more difficult to settle
informally.
2. Post-Remand Outcomes We began our study with a strong
belief in what might be called the "agency gets the last word" hypothesis.
That is, we expected that an agency to which a reviewing court remands
a case usually will end up reaffirming the position that it originally took.
This hypothesis was grounded in the same kind of Realist considera-
tions that had led us (erroneously, as it turned out) to doubt that the
Supreme Court's Chevron decision would have much effect on how the
courts of appeals disposed of agency cases. Agencies generally make pol-
icy decisions for what they think are compelling political, institutional,
and programmatic reasons. A court does not eliminate those goals when
it remands to the agency; it simply strengthens the agency's incentives to
find other ways to achieve them. Whether the agency gets the last word,
however, depends not only upon the agency's motivation, but also upon
the degree of constraint created by the control techniques available to a
remanding court. Courts generally employ these techniques in ways that
are designed to allow the agency considerable discretion and flexibility in
how to respond to the remand-this flexibility permits agencies to exploit
the technical and policy expertise for which they were established in the
first place.
In order for a reviewing court to have the last word, it must either
write remand opinions prescribing quite specifically what the agency may
and may not do with the remanded case,14" or engage in repeated re-
mands until the agency complies with the court's wishes. 145 Unless the
court is prepared to adopt one of these strategies, however, it may not be
able as a practical matter to prevent the agency from adhering to the
agency's original position.46 Yet both these strategies are problematic;
143. It was necessary to combine all of the other circuits in order to obtain sufficiently large
numbers to make the comparison meaningful.
144. SeA eg., Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (making very
specific findings on the interpretation of the Clean Air Act).
145. The classic example, of course, is the Morgan litigation, in which the case returned to the
Supreme Court three times after the Court's initial remand. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409
(1941); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938);
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
146. Our colleague Harlon Dalton has analyzed the struggle between appellate and trial courts
in much the same terms, expressing skepticism about the extent of trial court self-correction result-
ing from appellate review. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Les) Seriously, 95 YALE
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each risks undermining the principle of judicial respect for the agency's
expert judgment and programmatic responsibilities. We therefore ex-
pected that courts usually would acquiesce, perhaps grudgingly, in al-
lowing agencies the last word.
These considerations led us to formulate another, more specific hy-
pothesis about the interaction between the nature of controls exercised by
reviewing courts and the specific reasons for the remand. We supposed
that agencies are most likely to reaffirm their original decisions after ra-
tionale-based remands and are least likely to do so after law-based re-
mands. In particular, the agency should be least constrained when the
reviewing court does not reject what the agency has done, but simply
demands a fuller explanation of, and justification for, that action. It
should be most constrained when the court reverses the agency for hav-
ing applied the wrong legal standard; in that event, application of the
correct legal standard may well preclude the agency from doing what it
would like to do, regardless of which form of words and justifications the
agency uses to defend its result.
The data provide only weak support for our "agency gets the last
word" hypothesis. Our most striking findings are that the agencies reaf-
lirmed their original decisions in only 20-25% of the remanded cases;
Chevron did not really alter this percentage. However, in a substantially
larger share of cases-about 40% of the remands during the pre-Chevron
period and about 37% of those after Chevron-the post-remand process
actually produced what the lawyers agreed could be characterized as
"major changes."1 47 (See Chart 18.)
This "major changes" finding is especially impressive for two rea-
sons. First, lawyers for both the petitioners and the agencies, who might
have been expected to diverge greatly on this point, in fact came up with
roughly similar estimates of the occurrence of "major changes." Sec-
ond, the agencies were much more likely to adopt these changes by rely-
ing upon the "old facts" (i.e., facts that were already in the pre-remand
record) than by generating and relying upon "new" ones. 148 This sug-
gests that the mere occurrence of a remand, without more, frequently
causes an agency to alter its original position in important ways.
LJ. 62, 90-93 (1985). For the reasons stated in the text, we believed that such skepticism would be
even more warranted in the case of appellate review of agency action.
147. We made no effort to define what constituted "major" or "minor" changes, leaving such
characterizations to the responding lawyers.
148. Agencies relied upon "old facts" in about one-third of the pre-Chevron remands and 54%
of the post-Chevron ones, a change for which we have no explanation. In contrast, they relied upon
"new facts" in only about 20% of the pre-Chevron remands and about 17% of those after Chevron.
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Chart 18
Result After Remand (1984/85)
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It -would be interesting to know why, and under what circum-
stances, agencies change their original position after remand. 149 When
we broke down the data by agency cluster, the only pattern that we
found was that the health, safety, and environmental agencies and the
INS were least likely to make major changes after remand. 150 The cir-
cuit-by-circuit breakdown failed to reveal any strong pattern: Agencies
were less likely to make major changes in cases remanded from the D.C.
Circuit than from other circuits generally, but the differences were not
great.
More surprising was the fact that breaking down the data according
to remand type failed to provide any real support for our hypothesis,
noted above, that agencies subjected to law-based remands would be the
least likely simply to reaffirm. The agency's impetus to adopt changes
apparently is fairly independent of the degree of freedom allowed to the
149. We would especially like to know when agencies make major changes simply on the basis of
the old record, but at that level of data disaggregation our dataset is too small to present meaningful
findings.
150. The health, safety, and environmental agency cluster made a major change in about 10% of
its remands before Chevron and about 17% of them after Chevron; for the INS, the corresponding
percentages were 17% and zero, respectively. The number of remands to these agencies, however,
was relatively small. In contrast, some agency clusters experiencing more frequent remands made
"major changes" in 25% or more of the cases.
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agency by the particular type of remand. At a minimum, this would
seem to demonstrate that agencies are more open-minded than most
commentators have believed. A more speculative proposition is that
even when courts make rationale-based or fact-based remands-that is,
remands that leave the agency most free to reaffirm its original posi-
tion-they often communicate doubts about the merits of the underlying
agency policy, doubts that agencies apparently take seriously.
These inferences are strengthened further by the lawyers' responses
to two other questions. Approximately 40% responded affirmatively to
the query, "Did the court's remand affect the ultimate result reached by
the agency?" 151 Here again, we were struck not only by how large this
response was but also by how closely the responses by the lawyers for
both agencies and opposing parties converged on this point. 152 And
when we asked the non-agency lawyers to describe "the practical effect
on your client of the ultimate resolution by the agency after the court's
remand," approximately 40% selected the response "much more
favorable to client,"'153 while only about 17% selected the response
"about the same effect on the client as before remand." (See Chart 19.)
3. The Duration of Post-Remand Proceedings. We initially hy-
pothesized that the elapsed time between the date of the remand and the
date of the final agency action after remand would vary according to the
type of administrative proceeding, the type of remand, and the type of
agency. In particular, we expected that these proceedings would take
longer in the following situations: in rulemaking proceedings (as op-
posed to adjudications); in proceedings involving fact-based remands (as
opposed to remands involving law-based or rationale-based remands);
and in health, safety, and environmental agencies (as opposed to other
types of agencies). Our reasons for these expectations were discussed
earlier.154
151. The 40% figure refers to the pre-Chevron period. It was even higher in the post-Chevron
period-41% according to the agency lawyers and 52% according to their opponents.
152. After Chevron, however, the lawyers' views diverged more. See supra note 151 for these
figures.
153. The actual percentages were 39% pre-Chevron and 44% post-Chevron. We are not sure
what to make of the fact that the percentage of the agency lawyers who responded "less favorable to
client" was far lower (2% before Chevron, 9% after) than the percentage of their opponents who
responded "much more favorable to client." We must concede that the response choices could have
been more artfully phrased; for example "less favorable" is not quite the obverse of "much more
favorable." Other possibilities are that agency lawyers manage to find silver linings even in defeat or
that non-agency lawyers are more prone to exaggerate their litigation success than are their
opponents.
154. See supra Part uI(C)(1).
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We obtained responses on the duration of the proceedings for 127
cases, or about 90% of the cases that were remanded in the 1984-85 pe-
riod.155 The data reveal that the post-remand proceedings at the agency
level alone took about seventeen months to complete on average.156 Al-
most two-thirds of the remands were completed within a year, but one in
ten was still pending almost five years after the court remanded to the
agency. 157
155. For some cases, neither lawyer provided information on the duration of the proceedings.
For cases in which one of the lawyers provided it and the other did not, we used the information
provided. For those in which both lawyers provided duration information but their numbers dif-
fered, we averaged them for purposes of this analysis.
156. These duration figures are quite conservative for two reasons. First, the datasets included
18 cases that were still pending when the lawyer interviews were conducted. In our duration analy-
sis, we assumed that the cases from the 1984 dataset that were still pending were completed in 57
months and that the ones from the 1985 dataset were completed in 42 months. In fact, of course,
these cases had not been "completed" at that point; for all we know, they still may be pending.
Second, we measured elapsed time only from the date of remand. The duration of an administrative
proceeding as a whole was, of course, much longer, for it also must include (1) the time consumed
between the initiation of the proceeding and the date of the remand, and (2) the time consumed by
any post-remand judicial review. Third, we measured elapsed time from the end of each of the
datasets.
157. This figure refers to the 1984 remands. More than one in five (13 out of 60) of the 1985
remands was still pending three and a half years after the remand.
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The data on the duration of different types of proceedings seemed to
contradict our hypothesis that rulemakings would take longer than adju-
dications. But because the total number of rulemakings in our dataset
was small (only ten, or about 8% of the total during the entire 1984-85
period), and the standard deviations around all of the duration averages
were large, we cannot say that the hypothesis has been refuted. More-
over, the differences in duration between the two proceeding types were
generally small and the evidence pointed in different directions.' 58
Ratemakings took the longest time to complete (more than thirty months
on average), but there were relatively few of them (six during the entire
period).
When we analyzed the duration data according to the type of re-
mand ordered by the court, we failed to confirm our hypothesis that fact-
based remands would take longer to complete than law-based or ration-
ale-based ones. Law-based remands took the least time and rationale-
based remands took the longest time. The differences, however, were
small (generally less than two months) and the standard deviations were
large.
Similarly, our analysis of the data broken down according to partic-
ular agency cluster failed to confirm our hypothesis that health, safety,
and environmental agencies would take longer to complete. Indeed, the
only pattern that we could discern was that the remands to the INS took
longest to complete, but even here the number of cases was too small to
justify much confidence in this observation.
4. Significant Post-Remand Event& In administrative law, the
adage "justice delayed is justice denied" has a special meaning. It is not
simply that the victim of agency illegality, in the absence of a stay, may
continue to suffer while the agency's action remains in effect. The pas-
sage of time also Affects the substance of administrative decisions more
directly than it does decisions made in most other legal contexts.
This difference reflects two distinctive features of administrative law.
One is that the period of time elapsing between the original agency deci-
sion and the agency's post-remand response is often so protracted that
new developments-for example, changes in the applicable law, relevant
facts, or the political environment-are almost bound to occur. The
other is that the norms of administrative law permit, and sometimes even
require, those new developments to influence the merits of the underlying
158. For the 1984 remands, rulemakings took more than 13 months, or two to three months
longer than adjudications on average. For the 1985 remands, however, rulemakings averaged only
about seven months, which was actually 10 months shorter than the average adjudication. We are
unable to account for these disparities.
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agency decision in ways that would be inappropriate in a court decision.
The value placed upon the agency's technical expertise, broad policy dis-
cretion, and political responsiveness mean that agencies are expected to
take certain kinds of changes into account in their policy decisions to a
far greater extent than are courts. For example, the advent of a new
President, changes in agency leadership, and other political factors are
ordinarily deemed relevant to the merits. 159 Similarly, the agency ordi-
narily must take into account changing economic conditions, statutory
contexts, and court rulings. Far from seeking to insulate the agency
from these influences, administrative law recognizes their affirmative
value in shaping the climate, and often the substance, of decisions.
These normative considerations led us to formulate several descrip-
tive hypotheses about the kinds of events that occur after remand that
may influence the agency's subsequent decision. We expected that any
delay would increase the probability that intervening events would affect
the outcome of many agency decisions. 160 We thought that the most im-
portant of these events would be changes in presidential or agency leader-
ship, 161 changes in the relevant law (other than that represented by the
remand itself), and changes in economic or competitive conditions ger-
mane to the agency's programmatic agenda. Less important, we sup-
posed, would be changes in which lawyers handled a particular case.
The data reveal a high degree of agreement between the agency and
opposing lawyers concerning the incidence of significant intervening
events. Unfortunately, the wording of our question-"Were there any
significant intervening events . . . which might help to explain any
change?"-was more ambiguous than it might have been. We failed to
make clear that we were concerned only with remands in which the
agency altered its original decision. This was only a subset (albeit a sur-
Prisingly large one, as we learned) of all remanded cases. In what fol-
159. There are some limits on the right of agencies to take some of these factors into account,
especially in adjudications. See eg., D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1247-49
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (setting aside agency approval of bridge because of political threats by member of
Congress who supported bridge), cert denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); see also Motor Vehicle Mfg.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (rule change must not be arbitrary
and must be supported by record).
160. In thinking about the consequences of delay, it is important to distinguish three time-re-
lated factors that may affect outcomes: (1) the remand itself, because of how the reviewing court's
words or implications may alter the parties' expectations for success; (2) the prospect of further
proceedings, because of the additional transaction costs they may entail; and (3) the influence of
events that intervene between the agency's original decision and its final decision after the remand.
The fr st two are discussed above, see supra Part RI(C), "Remands and the Chevron Effect." Here,
we are concerned only with the third.
161. Presidential changes, of course, often lead to changes in agency leadership.
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lows, then, we have assumed that our respondents so understood the
question.
In almost one-third of the remands leading to changes (32%), the
lawyers responded either "no" or "don't know." This suggests that
when agencies change their positions on remand, those changes often
may have little to do with changes in the relevant personnel, politics, law,
policy, or economic conditions. In those cases, other factors-including
the appellate court's remand-rebuke to the agency-may better account
for the agency's change of heart.
Given that the remands we studied occurred around the midpoint of
a long presidential administration, we were not surprised to find that in
fewer than 2% of the remands was the agency's change caused by- a
change of national administration or of agency heads. Perhaps for simi-
lar reasons, an even smaller percentage of the changes after remand were
attributed to a change in the agency staff or lawyer handling the case.
Changes in economic or competitive conditions were cited as the reason
for the agency's new position in only about 2% of the remands.
The single most frequently cited reason for the agencies' post-re-
mand changes was the occurrence of a significant change in the law (or in
legislation, court decisions, or agency policy) other than the legal change
contained in the remand itself. But the fact that this affected only 17%
of the changed decisions on remand suggests that agencies that adopt
new positions usually do so for reasons having to do with factors internal
to the agency itself, rather than for "environmental" reasons.
Our residual category of intervening events ("other") was also large.
Fortunately, our interviewers often made notations on the coding sheets
describing which "other" events the lawyers had in mind. These other
events included the following: a different administrative law judge on
remand; publicity about the case; the pendency of other cases; a compro-
mise within the affected industry; a better rationale by the agency; agency
policy change; changes in circumstances that facilitated settlement; pub-
lication of a congressional report; and a change in the agency's partisan
composition.
We also expected that intervening changes in leadership, law, and
economic conditions would be most influential in those types of proceed-
ings and forums that we assumed would be most oriented to policy and
political considerations: rulemakings, ratemakings, and D.C. Circuit
cases generally. We could not draw any strong inferences from our anal-
ysis according to proceeding type, because although roughly one-fourth
of adjudications were said to be influenced by those kinds of changes, the
number of rulemakings and ratemakings in the sample was too small to
permit a meaningful comparison. When we analyzed the data according
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to circuit, we did not find the relationship we expected; in fact, the results
of D.C. Circuit remands were somewhat less likely to be influenced by
such changes than the remands in the other circuits, but the differences
were not great.
IV. SUMMARY OF PRiNCPAL FINDINGS
This Article has presented a welter of data bearing on numerous
hypotheses about administrative law. Lest the most important and in-
triguing findings be obscured by the lengthy discussions, it may be useful
to recapitulate them. We organize this summary of principal findings
around the four broad objectives of the study, which in turn defined the
four major sections of Part III. First, we hoped to produce some baseline
information about parameters such as the character, magnitude, and con-
sequences of judicial review of federal agency decisions. Second, by com-
paring this information at different points during a period spanning two
decades (1965-85) in which the court-agency relationship is widely
thought to have undergone a transformation, we hoped to discern
changes in these parameters over time. Third, we hoped to learn more
about remands, especially about what actually happens when the cases
go back to the agencies where they originated. Finally, we hoped to
gauge the effectiveness of the Supreme Court's highly controversial effort
in Chevron to regulate the court-agency relationship through a change in
legal doctrine.
Our analysis, we think, increases our understanding on each of these
points. As we noted at the end of Part II, however, we regard our find-
ings as more suggestive than conclusive. Some of these findings are in-
complete and in some cases impressionistic, as are some of the data on
which they are based. They cannot begin to capture the rich complexity
and diversity of federal administrative law, nor do they purport to do so.
In this regard, detailed case studies can provide far more textured ac-
counts of court-agency relationships than our data permit.16 2 But such
texture and detail come at a price. Studies that are agency-specific can
tell us little about the larger patterns traced on the political-legal land-
scape by federal agencies and courts. These larger patterns can be dis-
cerned only through the kind of panoramic and systemic, but inevitably
162. See, ,,g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputer What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4
(1983) (applying statistical analysis to determine the litigiousness of American society); Priest &
Klein, supra note 68 (applying statistical analysis to the decision of whether to settle or litigate);
Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan & Friedman, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing
in State Supreme Courts 1870-1970, 21 LAW & Soc'y REv. 403 (1987) (applying statistical analysis
to determine whether power and wealth influence court decisions).
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imprecise bird's-eye view attempted here. This view requires that a
much richer database be amassed and a greater analytical effort
mounted. 163
A. The Changing Style of Appellate Opinions
Our first finding, based on data published by the Administrative Of-
fice of the U.S. Courts (AO), is well known: The administrative law
caseload in the circuit courts has increased rapidly and, at least as mea-
sured by what the AO calls "termination on the merits" (as distinguished
from filings), fairly steadily. Less well known (but also based on that
published data) is that this larger caseload constitutes a rather small and
steadily shrinking portion of the circuit courts' dockets--only 7% in
1987.
A striking finding that may have wide-spread implications for ad-
ministrative law concerns the phenomenon of "table decisions"-sum-
mary decisions for which no reasoning or factual description is
published. Today, the majority of administrative law cases are disposed
of in this way. In 1985, almost 60% of all dispositions were by these
"table decisions," compared to 38% in 1975, and an unknown number in
1965.164 (See Table 1).
This phenomenon has received relatively little attention or sustained
analysis by academic commentators, and its significance for administra-
tive law is not yet clear. It is tempting to speculate on how the predomi-
nance of table decisions has affected the affirmance rate, yet even the
direction of causality remains uncertain. As we have seen, and as one
might expect, all but a handful (albeit a surprisingly large handful) of
these table decisions are affirmances. The dramatically increased use of
table dispositions may reflect an increase in affirmances caused by other
factors; in this view, table decisions are simply a less time-consuming
way to clear judicial dockets than writing full published opinions. On
the other hand, the increased use of table decisions may be a cause of a
higher affirmance rate, rather than (or as well as) an effect. In this view,
docket considerations motivate reviewing courts to dispose of cases sum-
marily, and summary dispositions can be accomplished most readily
through affirmance by table decision rather than reversal, remand, or af-
firmance by written opinion. Unfortunately, our data do not permit us to
163. The data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is useful but is
only a starting point for analysis. An earlier recommendation by the Administrative Conference
urged that the gathering and reporting of such data be improved. ACUS Recommendation No. 69-
6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings by Federal Departments and Agencies, 1
C.F.L § 305.69-6 (1988).
164. See supra Part III(A)(1).
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determine which of these views is correct, although the significant
number of table decisions that do not affirm tends to undercut the latter
view.
The potential importance of table decisions, however, goes well be-
yond its positive association with the affirmance rate. This method of
promulgating decisions raises fundamental questions of the legitimacy
and public perception of legal process. When courts dispose of a large
number of agency cases summarily and without opinion, administrative
law is deprived of the benefits of reasoned justification. In that event, it
loses the salutary intellectual discipline and normative significance that
opinion writing imposes, and its processes and outcomes appear arbi-
trary. If courts decide significantly more cases without having to justify
their decisions, administrative law becomes increasingly opaque and in-
coherent. On the other hand, routine cases should be handled routinely
and busy courts should not have to expend scarce time and effort bela-
boring the obvious and familiar. Because the shift toward table decisions
as the predominant form of resolution has occurred swiftly and without
adequate reflection, it is by no means clear that the current practice
strikes the optimal balance between these competing considerations.
This phenomenon clearly warrants further investigation.
Our findings concerning opinion length and footnoting are of lesser
importance, of course, but a few of them nevertheless are of some interest
for what they may reveal about the emerging style of administrative law
opinion-writing and the effect of docket pressures. 165 In general, opin-
ions written in the mid-1980s were much shorter on average than those
written a decade earlier, although this effect is almost entirely due to the
courts' increased use of table decisions. The D.C. Circuit writes longer
and more heavily footnoted opinions than the other circuits; in this re-
spect it is even more of an outlier than it was in 1975.
Of greater significance, perhaps, is our finding that consensus within
circuit courts, as measured by the proportion of one-opinion cases, in-
creased in all circuits between 1965 and 1975, and remained unchanged a
decade later, even when table decisions are excluded.1 66 Including them,
of course, would dramatically strengthen this consensus index. Even
more impressive is the maintenance of this level of consensus at a point
(1984-85) well into an administration that was determined to appoint
federal judges of a different ideological stripe. Again, the D.C. Circuit
was an outlier; in all periods its consensus level was lower than that in
the other circuits. Yet even the D.C. Circuit's consensus level appeared
165. See supra Part IH(A)(2).
166. See supra Part III(A)(3).
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to increase between 1975 and 1984-85, although more recent appoint-
ments to that court may well have reduced that consensus.
B. The Ages of Administrative Law
The most important finding that emerges from our twenty-year
punctuated longitudinal analysis is that the circuit courts are affirming
agency decisions at a steadily increasing rate, a rate that approximated
76% in 1984-85, and reached over 81% in 1985-just after Chevron.167
When we measure the petitioners' probability of success--combining the
reversals and the 40% of the remands in which the lawyers report a "ma-
jor change" in the agency's position on remand-we find that it was
about 12% in 1985, a figure that our 1988 data suggest may have in-
creased slightly as Chevron's effect weakened. A success rate of only
12% raises an important question as to why petitioners appeal as fre-
quently as they do. In Part III, we speculated that with respect to some
but not all agencies, the explanation may be found partly in the possibili-
ties for using appeals to delay the effect of agency action.' 68 This ques-
tion clearly warrants further research.
Our findings concerning the growth of rulemaking were somewhat
surprising.16 9 Although rulemaking's share of the administrative law
caseload increased twenty-fold between 1965 and 1984-85, it still consti-
tuted only 6.5% in the latter period. Even more striking is the fact that
when we excluded from our analysis agencies that apparently never used
rulemaking, and examined only those that sometimes use it, rulemaking's
share was still only 9.4% in 1984-85, a share that was actually lower than
it had been in 1975. We speculated in Part III that reviewing courts'
imposition of adjudicatory-type procedural and evidentiary burdens on
rulemaking during this period may have had the perverse effect of dis-
couraging its use.
This information relates to our finding concerning the agency com-
position of the administrative law caseload, which has changed dramati-
cally since 1965.170 A docket once dominated by labor and patent cases
is now dominated by labor, personnel, and immigration cases-virtually
all of which are adjudications. Agencies that engage in "social regula-
tion" accounted for less than 4% of the caseload in 1984-85. When we
examined the circuit court composition of the caseload, we found that
the D.C. Circuit's share of the national administrative law docket re-
mained remarkably stable over the twenty-year period, comprising about
167. See supra Part m(B)(1).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
169. See supra Part m(B)(2).
170. See supra Part III(B)(3).
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12% in 1984-85.171 The Federal Circuit's share (36%) was the largest,
distantly followed by the Ninth Circuit (15%). Another striking finding
was the steady decline in, and the rarity of, en bane decisions, especially
outside the Federal Circuit.172 Even including the Federal Circuit, fewer
than 2% of the non-table cases were heard en bane in 1984-85.
C. Remands and the Chevron Effect
If our data on dispositions and the use of table decisions indicate a
growing tendency of reviewing courts to defer to agencies, our data on
remands also suggest that the Supreme Court's Chevron decision has re-
inforced that deference, pushing the overall affirmance rate to levels
higher than those that prevailed in 1965, 1975, and 1984-just before
Chevron was decided. 173 Affirmances increased by almost 15% after
Chevron, and both remands and reversals declined by roughly 40%. The
post-Chevron affirmance rates, we found, were bimodally distributed; one
group of agencies clustered around 80%, while another group clustered
around 60%. We suggested that the different subject matters upon
which these two groups of agencies focus-a difference that results in the
first group's reliance on adjudication while the other group sometimes
uses rulemaking-might help explain this distribution.
When we refined our analysis of remands in order to appraise Chev-
ron's effect more precisely, four findings of interest emerged. 174 First,
more of the increased affirmances after Chevron "came from" reduced
reversals than from reduced remands. This "outcome displacement" ef-
fect was fully consistent with the purpose of Chevron, which was to make
it harder for reviewing courts to reverse for agency errors of law. Sec-
ond, Chevron was immediately followed by a large decline in substantive
law remands-the kind that Chevron aimed to discourage-while the to-
tal number of remands remained constant. Although these data would
seem to establish that Chevron also had a pronounced "reasons displace-
ment" effect, they actually are more equivocal than that. Third, the in-
crease in affirmance rates after Chevron had eroded by 1988; the
affirmance rate in 1988 had slipped to 75.5%, roughly halfway between
the pre- and post-Chevron rates. Fourth, the remand rate increased sig-
nificantly between 1985 and 1988, although fewer of the increased re-
mands "came from" reversals than Chevron's logic had led us to expect.
These findings suggest that Chevron affected outcomes differentially
and that those outcome effects differed over time. The expected affirm-
171. See supra Part IU(BX4).
172. See supra Part m(B)(5).
173. See supra Part M(C)(1).
174. See supra Part I(C)(2).
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ance-increasing effect occurred immediately but had weakened by 1988,
whereas the expected remand-increasing effect did not occur immediately
but was evident in 1988.175 These findings are consistent with the no-
tions that Chevron achieved its intended goal in the short run, and that
post-Chevron developments-including the Supreme Court's own weak-
ening of Chevron in subsequent cases and the lower courts' strategic re-
sponses to these decisions-frustrated those purposes as time passed.
When we disaggregated the data on the effects of Chevron by exam-
ining particular circuits and agencies, two other striking findings
emerged. 176 First, we found that the D.C. Circuit, whose affirmance
rates had been lower than those of the other circuits throughout the
twenty-year period and were far lower by the time Chevron was decided,
responded to Chevron by affirming even less often than before, in sharp
contrast to the other circuits, which responded to the decision by increas-
ing their already high affirmance rates. And, second, the "outcome dis-
placement" effect of Chevron turned out to vary considerably among the
agency groups; the affirmance rate actually declined for the immigration
agency and the "other regulatory" group.
Taken as a whole, our findings with respect to the effects of Chevron
on remands, although not unequivocal, support a general conclusion of
some significance to the analysis of legal process in administrative law.
On the evidence of this study, the Supreme Court is sometimes able to
effectively shape the court-agency relationship through the kind of rela-
tively broad, open-textured rule adopted in Chevron. For reasons that
we explained earlier,177 and because of the quite different conclusion
drawn by some commentators following the Court's Vermont Yankee de-
cision, 178 this finding was unexpected.
D. What Happens After Remand?
Our data concerning the response of agencies to judicial remands
yield one especially interesting finding. Our prediction that agencies
would manage to find ways to reaffirm their original decisions-what we
called "the agency gets the last word" hypothesis-was not borne out.179
In approximately 40% of the remands, the agencies adopted "major
changes," and most agencies appeared to do so primarily because of the
remand (i.e., on the basis of the old administrative record).
175. See supra Part HI(C)(3).
176. See supra Part HI(C(4)&(5).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 113-20.
178. See Scalia, supra note 114.
179. See supra Part III(D)(2).
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This 40% figure is much higher than we expected. But it does, of
course, mean that 60% of the remands did not result in any "major
changes." This means that petitioners succeeded in obtaining a major
change in the agency's position in only about 12% of the cases-the 8%
in which the circuit court reversed the agency outright, plus 40% of the
9% of the cases in which the court remanded, and the agency on remand
adopted a major change.
V. CONCLUSION
We believe that this Article demonstrates anew the value of using
large-scale statistical studies of cases, 180 here augmented by interviews
with lawyers, to subject important propositions about law and legal
change to empirical testing. Although we have deployed this technique
in the field of administrative law, its applicability extends as broadly as
the phenomenon of adjudication itself.
The traditional method of studying changes in the law-the "lead-
ing cases" approach developed by Christopher Columbus Langdell in the
19th century and still used today-is quite unsatisfactory. It posits that
the "law" (defined by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. as "what the courts
will do in fact"""1) can be captured in a few supposedly exemplary cases.
These cases-cases that are generally selected by academic writers using
unconscious, or at least unstated, principles of selection-are in turn as-
sumed to state principles of legal doctrine that explain the results in a
much larger number of disputes. As our colleague George Priest has
observed, however, this approach to doctrinal analysis has not proved
very useful in making predictions about law; better methods are
needed.18 2 We think that our study confirms Priest's skepticism about
the value of forming opinions about trends in the law based on state-
ments in a few leading cases and articles.
Our own methodology, of course, is far from perfect. The conclu-
sions to be drawn can be no better than the data on which they are based,
and the data relating to some of the most interesting characteristics of
decided cases are impressionistic and subject to competing interpreta-
180. See ag., J. MAsHAw, BuREAUCRATiC JUSTICE (1983) (Social Security Administration); J.
MASHAW & D. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AuTo SAsuTY (1990) (National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration); R. MELNICK, supra note 1 (Environmental Protection Agency); see also D.
Rosenbloom, The Federal Labor Relations Authority (1988) (unpublished manuscript) (available
from authors). With the support of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Peter
Schuck and Theodore Wang are drawing upon the data and methodology of this study and under-
taking a collaborative study of the relationship between a particular agency-the Immigration and
Naturalization Service-and the reviewing courts.
181. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
182. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 399-401 (1980).
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tions. Even apart from these problems, our analysis failed at certain
points to accomplish what we had hoped. 183
Still, this approach seems far more promising than the traditional
alternative, especially in the area of administrative law. The state of
knowledge about what agencies and reviewing courts actually do in most
cases, and about how Supreme Court directives influence their behavior,
is so primitive that studies of this kind are likely to produce valuable
information regardless of what their data show. If it had turned out, for
example, that the Chevron decision did not influence reviewing courts,
that would have been just as revealing and interesting a finding as our
actual results. As it happens, we are reassured to learn from our study
that the Supreme Court's law does indeed matter to reviewing courts,
and that their law, in turn, matters to agencies.
183. Some of the comparisons that we thought would prove interesting did not bear fruit-either
because our database was too small to permit multiple comparisons (eg., NLRB cases decided by
the First Circuit vs. NLRB cases decided by the Second Circuit), or because the factors that we
isolated for study turned out not to have as much predictive power as we imagined before we did the
study. Thus, for example, our hypothesis that the legal grounds on which courts remanded cases to
agencies might be a powerful factor influencing the agency's ultimate decision after remand turned
out to have been incorrect: We did not observe significant differences between the final results
reached when, for instance, courts remand on a procedural ground than when they remand for
further explanation.
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APPENDIX A-AGENCIES AND AGENCY GROUPINGS
A. National Labor Relations Board
NLRB National Labor Relations Board
B. Health and Environment
AEC/NRC Atomic Energy Commission/Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FMSHRC Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission
OSHRC Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission






























Securities and Exchange Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service
INS/Bureau of Immigration Appeals
Civil Service Commission
Merit Systems Protection Board




Department of Health and Human Services
* refers to the employing agency
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DHUD Department of Housing and Urban
Development
DOC Department of Commerce
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOED Department of Education
DOI Department of the Interior
DOJ Department of Justice
DOT Department of Transportation
DTRE Department of Treasury
USDA Department of Agriculture
H. Patent and Trademark
PAT Patent and Trademark Office'"
I. Other Administrative Agencies
ACTION
BCA Board of Contract Appeals (see originating
agency)
CIR Commissioner of Internal Revenue
CRT Copyright Royalty Tribunal
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FHLBB Federal Home Loan Bank Board
FLRA Federal Labor Relations Authority
FRB Federal Reserve Board
GAO General Accounting Office
GSA General Services Administration
INDCC Indian Claims Commission
IRS Internal Revenue Service
ITC International Trade Commission
OPM Office of Personnel Management
RRRB Railroad Retirement Board
SSA Social Security Administration
USPS U.S. Postal Service
VA Veterans Administration
WMATC Washington Metropolitan Authority Transit
Commission
184. By accident, this office was assigned the acronym "PAT" instead of the conventional
acronym, "PTO."
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APPENDIX B-CODING SHEET
Researcher: A. Case number
B. Citation: _ F2d _ C. D. Last Page






1. 3-judge 2. en bane
3. Table (shepardize) 4. 4 or more, not en bane
L. Date - - [last decision, e.g. reh. den.]
(Mo) (day) (year)
M. Agency proceeding type (circle)
1. Adjudication 2. Rulemaking
3. Ratemaking 4. Other Describe:
5. No indication or Table Case
N. Result code (circle all that apply) - Reviewing court:
1. Affirmed in toto 2. Affirmed in part
Reversed:
3. No jurisdiction 4. Other
* Remanded - law-based (supporting page)
5. Procedure 6. Substance
* 7. Remanded - fact-based (supporting page)
* 8. Remanded - rationale-based (supporting page)
9. Other (e.g. retained on docket)
10. Remanded - no indication of reason
11. Reversed - no indication of reason
Describe (remands & other):
AA. Standard of Review (circle all that apply)
1. De novo 2. Error of law
3. Substantial evidence 4. Capricious and arbitrary
5. Abuse of discretion
6. Other (Describe):
7. No indication.
" (remands only) Petitioner's counsel
(firm) (city)
" (remands only) Agency counsel
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Interview with Petitioner




0. Procedures after remand:
1. No further proceedings after remand.
Agency issued new opinion that:
2. Supplied additional explanations but no change in legal theory
or interpretation.
3. Adopted new legal theory or interpretation.
4. Agency supplemented record (additional evidence), but did not
hold new hearings.
5. Agency held additional hearings (oral or written).
6. Other (Describe):
P. Result after remand (circle all that apply) - Agency:
1. Re-affirmed earlier decision (no change in result).
2. Minor changes (Describe):
3. Major changes (Describe):
4. Agreed to settlement.
5. Adopted new legal theory.
6. Agency relied on old facts (in record at time of remand).
7. Agency relied on new facts (not in record at remand).
8. Agency issued new notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
9. Agency dropped the proceeding.
10. Other (Describe):
Subsequent proceedings citation(s)
(please send copy if unpublished)
Q. "Which of the following would you say best describes the practical
effect on your client of the ultimate resolution by the agency after
the court's remand?" (circle one):
1. Much more favorable to client.
2. Only slightly more favorable to client.
3. About the same effect on client as before remand.
4. Less favorable to client.
5. No opinion, or won't say.
R. "In your opinion, did the court's remand affect the ultimate result
reached by the agency?"
1. Yes (Describe how):
2. No.
3. No opinion, or won't say.
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S. "Were there any other significant intervening events between the
agency's original decision and its final decision which might help to
explain any changes?"
0. No, or don't know.
1. Change of national administration.
2. Change of agency head.
3. Change of agency staff or lawyer handling case.
4. Significant change of law (other than remand itself):
a. New legislation or amendment.
b. Other court decisions
c. Change of agency policy
5. Change in economic or competitive conditions.
6. Other (Describe):












U. Procedures after remand:
1. No further proceedings after remand.
Agency issued new opinion that:
2. Supplied additional explanations but no change in legal theory
or interpretation.
3. Adopted new legal theory or interpretation.
4. Agency supplemented record (additional evidence), but did not
hold new hearings.
5. Agency held additional hearings (oral or written).
6. Other (Describe):
V. Result after remand (circle all that apply) - Agency:
1. Re-affirmed earlier decision (no change in result).
2. Minor changes (Describe):
3. Major changes (Describe):
4. Agreed to settlement.
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5. Adopted new legal theory.
6. Agency relied on old facts (in record at time of remand).
7. Agency relied on new facts (not in record at remand).
8. Agency issued new notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
9. Agency dropped the proceeding.
10. Other (Describe):
Subsequent proceedings citation(s)
(please send copy if unpublished)
W. "Which of the following would you say best describes the practical
effect on the petitioner (i.e. the regulated party that sought judicial
review) of the ultimate resolution by the agency after the court's
remand?" (circle one):'
1. Much more favorable to petitioner.
2. Only slightly more favorable to petitioner.
3. About the same effect on petitioner as before remand.
4. Less favorable to petitioner.
5. No opinion, or won't say.
X. "In your opinion, did the court's remand affect the ultimate result
reached by the agency?"
1. Yes (Describe how):
2. No.
3. No opinion, or won't say.
Y. "Were there any other significant intervening events between the
agency's original decision and its final decision which might help to
explain any changes?"
0. No, or don't know.
1. Change of national administration.
2. Change of agency head.
3. Change of agency staff or lawyer handling case.
4. Significant change of law (other than remand itself):
a. New legislation or amendment.
b. Other court decisions.
c. Change of agency policy.
5. Change in economic or competitive conditions.
6. Other (Describe):
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APPENDIX C-USE OF WESTLAW IN EMPHuCAL RESEARCH
A. Use of Electronic Sources for Empirical Legal Research
As in all empirical research, there is the possibility of error in the
data collection process of a project this large. To minimize this risk, we
utilized WESTLAW computer search techniques to screen West's collec-
tion of federal appellate decisions to identify the set of cases that our
research assistants should have included in their data collection. We de-
cided to attempt the search rather late in the study's process, after the
research assistants had completed the hammer-and-tongs screening of
thousands of cases in the volumes of the Federal Reporter. Our hope, of
course, was that the WESTLAW search would generate the identical or
nearly identical set of cases as the research assistants.
Because we had used so many research assistants over the course of
the study's almost three-year duration, using another source to check the
data gathered was a valuable means of enhancing consistency among the
results of the data collection. We were indeed grateful for being able to
use the technique; checking the results of the WESTLAW search against
the database identified several "holes" in the databases that we filled
before completing the analyses. One very important instance of this was
our discovery that the cases in one volume of the Federal Reporter had
not been catalogued at all, suggesting either that there was some misun-
derstanding by at least one research assistant about his or her assignment
or that there was a problem with our data entry process. Although the
total number of other data collection errors was probably not significant
in terms of the statistical results of the study, the error-checking process
was, nonetheless, a valuable means of ensuring that the data we received
from the research assistants was consistent with what we expected them
to gather.
B. The Search Procedure of Our Study
The purpose of the search was to scan the WESTLAW federal ap-
pellate court files to locate the cases that belong in our 1965 and 1975
datasets. The criteria for locating "included" cases were that each case:
(i) had to be an appeal from an administrative agency; (ii) had to be
within the appropriate time period; (iii) must not have been a tax-related
decision; and (iv) must not have been an appeal from a district court.
The searches are reproduced below, following the general descriptions.
Narrowing the searches by date was fairly straightforward;
WESTLAW needs only the beginning and ending dates. We then nar-
rowed the search by topic by examining the WESTLAW "Topic List,"
flagging all topics related to administrative law, and then including them
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in the general search. The topics we chose appear in the searches below.
Then, to minimize the possibility of missing some entries by not selecting
all of the appropriate topics, we added a search of the syllabus of each
case for the word "administrative" (as in "appeal from administrative
order") or "petition" (as in "petition from [x] agency" or "petition for
review"). Finally, to eliminate the possibility of including tax-related or
district court cases, we eliminated entries for which the syllabus con-
tained "tax"," "taxation," "taxable" or "district."' 18 5
The search for 1975 was:
DA(AFT 1-1-65 & BEF 7-1-65) & (TOPIC (15A 24 77 83H 92H 99 114
148A 190 199 232A 243 258 450 283 291 300 304 306 310 313A 317
317A 320 339 349B 356A 372 382 383 404 405 411 412 413 414)
SY(ADMINISTRATIVE PETITION)) % SY(TAX** TAXATION
TAXABLE DISTRICT).
And for 1965:
DA(AFT 1-1-65 & BEF 7-1-65) & (TOPIC (15A 24 77 83H 92H 99 114
148A 190 199 232A 243 258 450 283 291 300 304 306 310 313A 317
317A 320 339 349B 356A 372 382 383 404 405 411 412 413 414)
SY(ADMINISTRATIVE PETITION)) % SY(TAX** TAXATION
TAXABLE DISTRICT).l86
After conducting the WESTLAW search, one of our research assist-
ants matched the entries in our databases against the lists generated by
WESTLAW. He flagged those cases appearing on the WESTLAW
search but not in our database, and he then checked the new cases identi-
fied by WESTLAW to see if we should include them. He also checked
those cases appearing in our databases which WESTLAW did not pick
up. This "double check" process led us to include a few additional cases
in the databases and to correct or delete some cases that were already
entered before conducting the final round of statistical analyses.
185. The district court screen may seem crude but is actually highly accurate. The syllabus of
every case that is an appeal from a district court contains the phrase "appeal from the district court
of--," and the word "district" is used very rarely for other purposes. While checking the results
of the search against our database, we discovered a few cases in our database that WESTLAW
eliminated by virtue of the search procedure's elimination of cases based on other constructions of
"district" (e.g., "water district"), but the number was very small. If we were to run another search
with the same goal of eliminating appeals from district courts, we would screen by "district court"
instead of by "district" only.
186. In WESTLAW-ese, "or" is implied when there is no connector between entries. Therefore,
SY(ADMINISTRATIVE PETITION) translates to "the word ADMINISTRATIVE or the word
PETITION appears in the syllabus" (of course, both may appear). Further syntax includes: %
means "but not"; "" is a universal ("wildcard") character which permits any number of characters
to appear in its location.
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APPENDIX D-DATA ON THE LENGTH AND FOOTNOTING OF
OPINIONS
The data generally bear out our expectation that the D.C. Circuit
would write longer, more heavily footnoted opinions than the other cir-
cuits. Perhaps more interesting, however, is the fact that the disparity
did not appear until the 1975 period, after which it increased significantly
over time. During the 1965 period, the D.C. Circuit's average length (5.9
pages) was actually less than the average among all circuits (6.5 pages).
But ten years later, this pattern had changed. Excluding table deci-
sions,187 the D.C. Circuit's opinions ten years later had almost doubled in
length (to 11 pages) and were more than 40% longer than the all-circuits
average of 7.7 pages. (The Second Circuit's opinions were longer still,
averaging 12.2 pages.) By the 1985 period, the D.C. Circuit's opinions
had not only grown another 12% longer (to 12.4 pages) but were consid-
erably longer than those of any other circuit and more than 60% above
the all-circuits average. 18
One might seek to explain the steady lengthening of the D.C. Cir-
cuit's opinions as simply reflecting a more general tendency toward
greater judicial prolixity. The data, however, suggest otherwise. In fact,
the all-circuits average opinion length was about the same in 1985 as it
was in 1975 (7.7 pages). If table decisions were included in the analysis,
the average opinion length would actually be much lower in 1985 than in
1975.189
As striking as the growing length of D.C. Circuit opinions is the fact
that the disparity between it and the other circuits in this respect is also
increasing. Two plausible explanations for this growing disparity occur
to us. First, it might reflect the facts (if these propositions are true) that
the D.C. Circuit's docket of administrative law cases is not only heavier
but is more complex than that in other circuits and that its complexity
relative to that in other circuits has also increased. Second, factors related
to the particular membership of the D.C. Circuit might account not only
187. For analytical purposes, it is important to do so because we coded each table decision as
being one page in length. In addition, of course, they contain no footnotes and no separate opinions.
As table decisions become a more significant part of the study sample, therefore, they increasingly
distort the data on those variables.
188. See also Eisenberg & Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court Systems?, 56 U.
Cm. L. REv 501, 505-06 (1989), for the proposition that the D.C. Circuit's opinions are twice as
long, and contain six times as many footnotes, as other circuits. The D.C. Circuit's average in the
most recent period was probably disproportionately affected by one or a few long opinions, as re-
flected by a large standard deviation (10.3).
189. The opinions in the Federal Circuit, which did not exist in 1975 but which accounted for
17% of the cases in our 1985 dataset (only the D.C. Circuit, with over 21%, accounted for more),
were among the shortest, averaging 5.6 pages.
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for the longer opinions but also for the greater inter-circuit disparity over
time. Although several such factors might have been operating, the most
plausible one is the degree of divisiveness on that court relative to others
and over time. Our data permit us to shed some light on that variable,
and we discuss it below in section (C) relating to the fragmentation of the
circuit courts' decisions.
We also had hypothesized that regardless of the circuit, the length of
appellate court opinions and the amount of footnoting in agency cases
would vary depending upon certain features of the judicial review set-
ting. Four features were of particular interest: (1) the type of agency
proceeding being subjected to judicial review; (2) the nature of the re-
viewing court's disposition of the case, especially in remands; (3) the
compositional structure of the reviewing court; and (4) the type of
agency under review.
A. Agency Proceeding Type
We expected that the length and footnoting of opinions would be
greater in ratemaking and rulemaking proceedings than in adjudica-
tions.'90 This expectation was based upon the belief that ratemakings
and rulemakings, relative to adjudications, tended to involve more tech-
nical legal and policy issues, longer records, a larger and more diverse
group of parties, and broader applicability and precedential significance.
These features, we thought, would induce courts to write more elaborate,
heavily documented, and reversal-proof opinions.
The best data for testing our hypothesis were in the 1975 sample,191
and they strongly confirmed it. The average opinion length in remak-
ings was 15.4 pages, more than twice the length of adjudication opinions.
Ratemaking opinions were also longer than adjudications, averaging 9.9
pages. The anticipated pattern was further confirmed by the data on the
190. We had, of course, expected our data to confirm the post-1965 move by many agencies from
an almost exclusive preoccupation with adjudication to a greater use of rulemaking; see S. BREYER
& R. STEWART, supr note 35, at 473. Still, the magnitude and swiftness of that sea change sur-
prised even us. While more than 92% of the cases in our 1965 sample were adjudications and less
than 2% were rulemakings or ratemakings, the proportion of adjudications only 10 years later had
declined to just over 50%, and the rulemakings and ratemakings accounted for almost 10%. By
1984-85, adjudications constituted only 33%, but by this time (unlike in 1975) the data on agency
proceeding type were confounded by the large number of table cases in the sample, thus significantly
reducing the percentage of the total that were adjudications.
191. The reason is that the number of rulemakings (and to a lesser extent, ratemakings) was too
low in 1965 to support any conclusions, while in 1984-85 the number of table decisions was so large
as to distort the data on average opinion length.
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footnoting of opinions, which we took to be a very rough proxy for the
degree of documentation of evidence.192
B. Nature of Court's Disposition
We expected law-based remands 193 to be longer and more heavily
footnoted than any other type of remand. This hypothesis reflected our
belief,. similar to our view (now confirmed) concerning the agency pro-
ceeding type variable, that courts would devote greater care to those
opinions in the belief that law-based remands would usually have broader
applicability and precedential significance than fact-based or rationale-
based remands. 194
The data refuted this hypothesis. During the 20-year period of the
study, law-based remand opinions were usually, although not invariably,
shorter and less heavily footnoted than either fact-based or rationale-
based remands. 195 Whatever the factors influencing opinion length and
footnoting may be, remand type does not appear to be one of them.
C. Compositional Structure of Reviewing Court
We had also expected that three-judge panels would tend to write
shorter and less heavily footnoted opinions than larger panels or the en-
tire court en banc. This expectation was based upon our two assump-
tions, mentioned earlier, that cases selected for en banc decision are
generally more complex and controversial than the others; and that quite
independent of the complexity of the case, greater diversity and disagree-
ment will be generated as the number of decisionmakers is increased. We
speculated that in order to produce a majority in these circumstances, the
opinion writer must engage in more elaborate justification, more numer-
ous distinctions of a doctrinal or factual kind, and more conspicuous ef-
forts at supporting the decision with the kinds of references that lend
themselves to footnoting. We expected that these imperatives would be
reflected in longer opinions and more extensive footnoting.
192. Rulemakings and ratemakings averaged 24.4 and 37 footnotes, respectively, while adjudica-
tions averaged 11.8.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
194. Our colleague, Professor Ruth Wedgwood, had the opposite expectation. She believed that
law-based remands would use fewer footnotes because as a matter of form and convenience, legal
authorities can be, and often are, cited in text. Conversation with Ruth Wedgwood in New Haven,
Connecticut (Feb. 8, 1990).
195. During the most recent period (1984-85), law-based remands had opinion lengths averaging
seven (for procedure-based ones) and eight pages (for substantive-based ones), compared to an aver-
age of 10 and 11 pages for fact- and rationale-based ones. Law-based remands averaged six and eight
footnotes respectively, compared to 11 footnotes for fact- and rationale-based ones.
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Before discussing the data relating opinion length and footnoting to
court composition, we should underscore one important finding: The use
of en bane decisions has declined dramatically. Indeed, the number of en
bane decisions in our samples for the 1975 and 1984-85 periods is so
small (12 in each period) that our opinion length and footnote averages
are probably not very meaningful in absolute terms.
In any event, no consistent pattern emerges when we analyze the
non-table decisions for these variables. In 1965, when the number of en
banc decisions was still large (143), they averaged more footnotes than
the 209 three-judge panel decisions (5 and 4, respectively), but in 1975
the averages were almost identical and in 1984-85 en bane decisions were
actually less heavily footnoted than three-judge decisions. Opinion
lengths revealed the same pattern; en bane decisions were longer in 1965,
the same length in 1975, and shorter in 1984-85.
D. Agency Type
We had hypothesized that opinions remanding to health, safety, and
environmental agencies would be longer and more heavily footnoted than
those remanded to other agencies. Most other commentators who have
considered this distinction observe that the newer health, safety and envi-
ronmental agencies generally possess broader and stronger regulatory au-
thority, make very technical decisions, regulate more diverse firms and
industries, function under closer congressional, White House and judicial
oversight, and operate in a more complex political environment. 196
These agency characteristics, we thought, would produce the hypothe-
sized effects in the length and footnoting of opinions.
Our data suggest some support for this hypothesis but also reveal
the magnitude of the change in the regulatory world that occurred in the
decades after 1965. In 1965, our sample of non-table decisions contained
only one opinion reviewing health, safety, and environmental regulation,
and it was one-third shorter than opinions generally (4 pages versus 6).
By 1975, after many new "social regulation" agencies had been estab-
lished, 11% of the opinions in our sample reviewed health, safety, and
environmental agencies, and those opinions were almost 50% longer
than opinions generally (11.2 pages versus 7.7). By the 1984-85 period,
when opinions reviewing these agencies constituted about 7% of the
sample, those opinions were still longer than opinions generally (9.3
pages versus 7.7) but the difference was less. In both 1975 and 1984-85,
196. See ag., THE PoLrTIcs OF REGULATION (J. Wilson ed. 1980); Lilley & Miller, supra note
80, at 49-55; Schuck, The Politics of Regulation (Book Review), 90 YALE L.J. 702, 708-11 (1981)
(reviewing THE POLrTICS OF REGULATION, supra).
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only one category of agencies-the "other regulatory" grouping-gener-
ated longer reviewing court opinions than the health, safety, and environ-
mental agencies (about 1.5 pages longer in both periods).
When we examine the footnoting practices of courts reviewing dif-
ferent kinds of agencies, the same pattern emerges. The one health,
safety, and environmental case in 1965 was less extensively footnoted
than opinions generally, but by 1975 such cases were more heavily foot-
noted than opinions generally; that continued in the 1984-85 period,
although the difference was less. And as with opinion length, the only
other category of agencies that generated more extensive footnoting was
the "other regulatory" grouping.
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APPENDIX E--RECONCILIATION WITH ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE DATA
The Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts contains numerous statistics on the caseload of the federal
court system, including some data on appeals to the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals from administrative agencies. Although the AO data appear simi-
lar to our data, they are not fully comparable because of several
differences in their compilation methodology.
1) The AO data is published in annual compilations from July 1 to
June 30 of each year, rather than the six-month compilations of various
months in our study. The differences in time periods complicate direct
comparisons of the datasets by requiring assumptions about the annual
distribution of caseloads in the analysis.
2) Second, definitions of terms such as "affirmed" or "remanded"
differ between the two datasets. For example, the AO uses the term "af-
firmed" to include many cases which are reversed in part, and may be
more analogous to the sum of our categories of "affirmed" and "affirmed
in part." In addition, the AO only began reporting "remanded" cases as
a separate category in 1985. Some of the definitions may also have
changed over time, such as the description of reported cases as "disposed
of after hearing or submission" to "termination on the merits" in 1985.
It is difficult even to identify when some of these changes occurred be-
cause most of the terms utilized by the AO are not defined, especially in
the older data compilations.
3) The two studies utilize different methods of gathering data, each
with its own advantages and disadvantages. The AO gathers its data
from forms completed by clerks in each of the courts as part of the regu-
lar paper process, which has the advantage of drawing data from unpub-
lished decisions and may allow the clerk to utilize information outside of
the actual opinion to characterize the case. However, the AO's decen-
tralized subjective categorization of the data may lead to geographical
and temporal inconsistencies. For example, the 1987 data contain some
major errors in one circuit in the characterization of cases as "re-
manded" or "reversed," and the 1977 data on the administrative appeal
caseload and affirmance rate are suspiciously anomalous. The methodol-
ogy of our study should allow for a more consistent categorization of
cases because it is applied post hoc by relatively few individuals. How-
ever, the scope of our study is limited to opinions published within only
10% of the twenty-year time span of the study.
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4) The AO does not include appeals from the Patent and Trade-
mark Office or from the Merit Systems Protection Board in its compila-
tions on administrative agencies. 197
With these differences in mind, a comparison between the AO data
and our data is presented below. The comparison corrects for the differ-
ence discussed in (4) by removing the Patent and Trademark Office and
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) data from our dataset, and
partially corrects for the difference discussed in (2) by utilizing our char-
acterization of cases resulting in "affirmed" or "affirmed in part" to com-
pare with the AO's characterization of "affirmed." Note that our 1985
data cover the period from February 25, 1985 to September 30, 1985, and
thereby extends two months into the AO's 1986 data year.
NUMBER OF APPEALS TO THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FROM
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AO's "Appeals Terminated
on the Merits" Published Cases in a





PERCENT OF APPEALS TO THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FROM
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES WHICH ARE AFFIRMED
AO's Compilation Published Cases in a





Our affirmance rate data and the AO's are close, except for 1965.
We strongly suspect that the difference for 1965 is the effect of table
decisions. The AO data include all terminations; a case has to be
included in the AO data before it can be removed from the docket. Our
data, on the other hand, were gathered from cases published in the
Federal Reporter. For recent years, the difference is not great, since the
197. See ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIREcrOR OF THE ADMINSTRATIVE OFcFE o THE U.S.
COuRTS 105 (1987) (Table S-1, "U.S. Courts of Appeals; Appeals Filed by Circuit Involving Admin-
istrative Agency Decisions During the Twelve Month Period Ending June 30, 1987").
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bound volumes now include most of the decisions that were previously
unpublished. The difference was presumably much greater in 1965,before the Federal Reporter began to report table decisions.
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